# 1AC --- Platform Utilities

## 1AC --- Platforms --- v4

### 1AC --- Advantage --- Russia

#### Advantage one is Russia:

#### Platform monopolies integration with Mass media paves the way for misinformation and atomization

Lynn, 21 (Barry Lynn, Executive director of the open markets institute. Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition, and Consumer Rights, 3-11-21, accessed on 8-11-2021, Judiciary.senate, "Competition Policy for the Twenty-First Century The Case for Antitrust Reform.", https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Lynn%20-%20Antitrust%2021st%20C%20-%20%203-\_\_11-21%20.pdf)//Babcii

But let’s be clear. This is no isolated instance. We see this same fear to speak out in almost every corner of the American political economy today. This includes companies that depend on Amazon to get to market, including even the most powerful of book publishers. We see the same fear among the companies that depend on Google and Facebook to get to market, including even the most powerful of news publishers. We see the same fear among the companies that depend on Amazon and Google and Apple to distribute their films and music and television shows, including even the most powerful producers of art and entertainment. The breakdown of information systems. Democracy also depends on the ability of citizens to communicate freely with one another, and to deliberate with one another based on a roughly similar understanding of facts. But the combination of monopolization and discrimination is swiftly breaking down the systems Americans have long used to gather, process, share, and debate news and information with one another. Two threats especially stand out. The first is the way in which dominant intermediaries – Google and Facebook foremost – are exploiting their chokeholds to divert advertising into their own vaults, away from independent publishers. This diversion of tens of billions of dollars has resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of journalism positions across the nation. And it has resulted in the bankrupting of thousands of important publications, and the financial degradation of thousands more. The overall result is that less and less well-reported, well-edited, trustworthy information is generated in the United States as a whole, and within each individual region of the United States specifically. Open Markets was among the very first organizations to warn of this threat, in public events in the summer of 20162 and 2018.3 Since then, this threat has received a lot of attention, from policymakers and law enforcers around the world, including recent public and private antitrust lawsuits in the United States. There is some good news here. Senator Klobuchar just yesterday introduced important legislation that would provide news publishers with breathing room, while Americans work out a permanent fix to the problem. But thus far, however, no legislature has developed a mature plan to rebuild a truly open and competitive market for news and information that is not – to at some degree – ultimately regulated, manipulated, and taxed by Google and Facebook. The second threat derives from that combination of monopolization and discrimination. Here the basic problem is that Google and Facebook increasingly deliver different news, information, and advertising – including highly targeted propaganda and misinformation – to each individual citizen. Google and Facebook say that such targeted information serves the interests of each individual citizen. Whether that is true or not, the ultimate political result is an atomization of the public, to a degree that makes it ever more difficult for citizens to engage with one another through constructive political interaction, and to identify and master the great problems of our time.

#### Partisanship and division undermines global commitments

Trubowitz, 19 (Peter Trubowitz, Professor of international relations at the London School of economics and political science, 5-16-2019, accessed on 8-11-2021, Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, "Will Dysfunctional Politics Finally End the American Century?", https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/will-dysfunctional-politics-finally-end-american-century#)//Babcii

America is suffering from a shortage of functional or ‘usable power.’ While relative power as measured by its military arsenal vis-à-vis those of its rivals has held steady, the domestic political ability of US presidents to turn the country’s tremendous power and wealth into international influence is declining. This has been the case for some time now. America’s deficit of usable power did not begin with Donald Trump, but it has grown measurably on his watch as president. Presidents’ usable power depends on their ability to win the support of a broad cross-section of the voting public for their foreign policy agenda. Historically, presidents have relied on three tools to gain public buy-in: bipartisanship on Capitol Hill, the leader’s ability to set the terms of debate and the design of economically inclusive policies. Each contributed mightily to the public consensus underpinning US foreign policy for decades after the Second World War. Today, all three are in short supply. Bipartisanship was the norm in foreign policymaking during the Cold War. Democratic presidents could count on the support of moderate eastern Republicans in Congress; Republican presidents relied on the support of conservative southern Democrats. Domestic voters, who worried about presidents’ partisan motives, found such bipartisan support reassuring. So did America’s allies and friends overseas. They worried that in the absence of bipartisan support, international commitments taken by one president would be reversed or soft-pedaled when the party out of power gained control of the White House. This is exactly what has happened since the end of the Cold War. Foreign policymaking has become increasingly partisan and erratic. Incoming presidents now look for opportunities to undo their predecessors’ legacies, something that rarely happened during the Cold War. George W Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and opposed the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. Barack Obama ended US involvement in Iraq. Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pulled out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and renounced the Iran nuclear deal. US relative power may not have changed much since the 1990s, but these examples show decline in America’s willingness to engage and commit internationally as well as in how credible others view its international pronouncements. If hyper-partisanship has made US commitments worth less internationally, the absence of a shared vision of America’s international purpose has made bipartisanship harder to produce domestically. To build lasting bipartisan coalitions, presidents must structure the national conversation in ways that convince voters that their administration’s preferred international policies will strengthen national security and increase economic opportunity while making it hard for their political opponents to mount an effective challenge.

#### That spurs nuclear proliferation and probing --- Extinction

Montgomery, 16 (EVAN BRADEN Montgomery, Evan Braden Montgomery is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Dr.Montgomery graduated summa cum laude from Villanova University with a B.A. in Political Science and Sociology, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia., 2016, accessed on 7-23-2021, Csba, "EXTENDED DETERRENCEIN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ", https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6183-ExtendedDeterrence\_PRINT.pdf)//Babcii

Extended deterrence can help the United States uphold the status quo in several ways. Specifically, it can discourage revisionist powers from provoking crises or launching wars because there is a high probability that Washington will intervene to deny their aims and punish them for acts of aggression; it can dissuade friendly nations from developing controversial military capabilities that might heighten local tensions or trigger regional conflicts because those nations can rely on the United States instead; and it can offer a source of leverage over security partners, one that helps the United States to discourage other courses of action that might prove destabilizing and encourage positive steps on a variety of issues. Despite its importance, extended deterrence is one of the most challenging aspects of American strategy. While persuading adversaries that the United States would retaliate for a direct attack is relatively easy, convincing them that it would retaliate for an attack against other nations is a much more difficult proposition. Furthermore, convincing allies that the United States will actually fight on their behalf—even if that means putting its own troops and territory at risk—can be even harder.4 As Thomas Schelling famously wrote, when it comes to deterrence, “The difference between the national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that have to be made credible.”5 Not surprisingly, efforts to make extended deterrence credible in the eyes of adversaries and allies alike have shaped virtually every aspect of American military power. For instance, the United States has adhered to a conventional military strategy that emphasizes countering threats when and where they emerge rather than depending on local nations to prevent aggression or roll back expansion; it has fielded combined-arms forces capable of resisting distant rivals, even those with quantitative advantages in men and materiel; and it has built a global network of military bases to deploy, operate, and sustain those forces overseas.6 Finally, but equally important, it has relied on its nuclear arsenal for the purpose of extending deterrence to its allies and partners.7 Throughout the Cold War, strategic nuclear weapons provided Washington with the capacity to conduct a devastating reprisal against the Soviet Union if Moscow ever launched a nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland or the Red Army attempted to overrun Europe. At the same time, theater and battlefield nuclear weapons, many of which were permanently stationed on allied territory, could be used to blunt an offensive by numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces if NATO’s conventional units were not up to the task.8 These weapons were also used to “couple” the United States to its vulnerable frontline partners, who had doubts that Washington would truly employ its strategic nuclear forces on their behalf. By raising the prospect of early nuclear use against Soviet troops and territory, the presence of non-strategic weapons signaled a U.S. willingness to escalate in defense of its allies rather than withdrawal to North America in the face of a successful Soviet invasion.9 Over the past twenty-five years, however, many of the extended deterrence dilemmas that occupied U.S. policymakers in the past—especially the dilemmas associated with extended nuclear deterrence—ceased to be a major source of concern. With Russia in decline and China focused on sustaining its economic rise, treaty allies in Europe and Asia have been relatively safe from serious threats. Meanwhile, as the world’s sole superpower, the United States has enjoyed enormous military advantages over potential rivals and has been able to rely on its conventional forces to discourage aggression. This favorable situation appears to be changing, though, putting extended nuclear deterrence back on the agenda. For example, although the unipolar moment appeared to herald the waning of geopolitics and the end of major power security competitions, at least according to some observers, revisionist actors are once again challenging the status quo in multiple regions.10 Russia’s invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea, and support for rebel groups in eastern Ukraine all indicate that Moscow does not respect the political order of post-Cold War Europe. At the same time, China’s conventional military buildup has shifted the balance of power in Asia, while its “creeping expansion” in the South China Sea could enable Beijing to assert greater control over one of the world’s most vital waterways. And despite the recent agreement to constrain its nuclear program, Iran continues to build offensive missile forces and support violent extremist groups. In short, Russia’s piecemeal efforts to restore its lost continental empire, China’s military expansion in its near seas and beyond, and Iran’s willingness to both create and fill power vacuums throughout its neighborhood all suggest that “geopolitical rivalries have stormed back to center stage.”11 Compounding this trend, the world is now in the midst of what many analysts refer to as a “second nuclear age,” one that is arguably more complex and potentially more volatile than the bipolar U.S.–Soviet struggle that characterized the Cold War.12 Not only does the United States still need to worry about maintaining strategic stability with a nuclear peer, albeit one possessing far fewer weapons than it did in the past, but it must also manage a number of other existing and emerging challenges: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to fragile nations, the expansion of nuclear arsenals by minor powers and aspiring major powers, and the pursuit of capabilities that are lowering the barriers to nuclear use and eroding the “firebreak” between conventional and nuclear conflict.13

#### It also creates vulnerabilities that invite Russian exploitation

Stanage, 18 (Niall Stanage, Irish journalist and Associate Editor of the American political newspaper, 2-25-2018, accessed on 8-11-2021, TheHill, "The Memo: Russia finds weapon in US divisions", <https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/375382-the-memo-russia-finds-weapon-in-us-divisions>)

Growing political polarization in the United States is a vulnerability that foreign adversaries are exploiting — and experts worry the trend will accelerate. The threat was brought into sharp relief by the indictment of 13 Russians as part of special counsel Robert Mueller’s probe into allegations of collusion between Moscow and the 2016 Trump campaign. The Russian efforts, according to the indictment, were part of a broader effort “to sow discord in the U.S. political system,” achieved mostly by fanning the flames of divisive debates already raging in the country. There is bipartisan concern that the constant tearing of America’s political fabric provides an **opening for Russia**, or any other hostile power, to exploit. “It’s just so easy in today’s polarized environment to take advantage of the biases that people have, and their addiction to social media, and their seeking out information that confirms their preconceived views,” said former Rep. Jason Altmire (D-Pa.). Altmire, who served three terms in Congress, recently authorized a book on political polarization, called "Dead Center: How Political Polarization Divided America and What We Can Do about It." Former New Jersey Gov. Christine Todd Whitman, a centrist Republican, expressed a similar view of the threat. “We can’t accept doing nothing — just shrugging our shoulders,” Whitman told The Hill. She said there’s a need to provide states and localities with funding and training to help them identify and rebuff efforts to meddle in elections. But she acknowledged that the broader shift toward the political extremes would be difficult to counteract, especially when the media has become so fractured. “There is no Walter Cronkite anymore,” Whitman said, referring to the legendary CBS News anchorman whose word carried weight with Americans of all political persuasions during his prime in the 1960s and 1970s. Foreign policy specialists have also sounded the alarm. In a New York Times op-ed last month, former President Obama’s national security adviser Susan Rice argued that “the most significant, long-term threat to our security may be our domestic political polarization.” Rice added, “We need to decide whether we want to remain the world’s pre-eminent power — a strong, cohesive beacon of democracy — or if we are content to allow our national autoimmune disorder, like a flesh-eating disease, to devour our body politic.” Skeptics of the Russia story have noted that there is nothing particularly new or unusual about attempts by Moscow, or by other adversaries, to try to affect public opinion in the United States — just as Washington has meddled in other nation’s affairs for decades. But experts in the area argue that the difference now is that the depth of America's divide makes such attacks more effective. John Sipher spent 28 years in the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. He told The Hill that the Kremlin had been seeking to influence American public opinion “for 70, 80 years.” But, he added, two factors make today’s landscape more fertile ground for such efforts. One, he said, was the way in which “the ability to weaponize information via social media has changed.” In addition he said, “the big problem is us. Our hyperpartisanship and our tribal behavior are dry tinder for the Russians.” The recent indictments make clear the extent to which Russians apparently sought to inflame divisions. Prosecutors allege that they sought to capitalize on racial and religious tensions, backed left-wing Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) as well as President Trump in the 2016 campaign, falsely suggested Hillary Clinton harbored sympathies for Sharia law, and even promoted competing pro- and anti-Trump rallies following the 2016 election. Efforts to fuel the flames of American enmity are allegedly ongoing.

#### That causes Russian hybrid war that escalates globally

Trenin, 18 (Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, chairs the research council and the Foreign and Security Policy Program, 1-25-2018, accessed on 8-11-2021, Carnegie Moscow Center, "Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation During the Hybrid War", http://carnegie.ru/2018/01/25/avoiding-u.s.-russia-military-escalation-during-hybrid-war-pub-75277)//Babcii

. The war is being fought simultaneously in a number of spheres, on different levels, and in the never-ending, twenty-four-hour news cycle. This aspect of warfare is particularly true of the field of information, which is of prime importance in the Information Age that emerged with the end of the Cold War. From cyber conflicts and the use of artificial intelligence to the predominance of propaganda and fake news, the main battles of the Hybrid War are taking place outside of the purely physical realm and in the domain of new information technologies. Just as important to the Hybrid War is economics, which has been the key driver of globalization that paralleled the rise of these innovative information technologies. The prominence of the U.S. media and the United States’ immense financial power give it a huge advantage in both fields. As a result, the weapons of choice in the Hybrid War are those that use information and economic power to discredit and sanction one’s adversaries.3 Politically, the Hybrid War includes the outside stimulation of political changes in other countries through street activism and the promotion of specific values, parties, or popular movements. It has been characterized by interference in elections, political transitions, and other political processes, including various efforts to hack sensitive information, spread compromising or damaging materials and fake news, encourage character assassinations, and impose personal and other noneconomic sanctions (for example, restrictions on travel, seizure of assets, imprisonment, or deportation) on opponents. The existence of a common information space makes waging political warfare on foreign territory much easier and more attractive than ever before. Cross-border promotion of democracy and support for the color revolutions that dominated the 2000s (for example, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine) have now found counterparts in emerging solidarity among those who espouse more conservative and traditionalist values, such as political systems based on authoritarian models and strict national sovereignty.4 Military power is not out of the picture—though its use is different than in the Cold War. The static standoff of million-strong armies in Europe and the long shadow of the nuclear arms race have drawn down or faded. Nuclear deterrence between Russia and the West remains in place but at lower and more stable levels than during the Cold War. Today’s risks of miscalculation derive from potential incidents involving conventional forces. A token military standoff has reemerged along Russia’s border with NATO countries, but, to date, this standoff bears no resemblance in either scale or scope to the forces that faced each other during the Cold War. The main focus is on developing new military technologies and novel means and ways of prosecuting warfare—from outer space to cyberspace—that blur or eliminate the distinction between wartime and peacetime. Like its predecessor, the Hybrid War is a war in the time of peace. Even more than in the past, however, the onus is on national leaderships to minimize the number of casualties, ideally to zero. Russian military strategists had developed the concept of hybrid warfare even before the actual conflict broke out in earnest between the United States and Russia in early 2014. Analyzing the experience of the post-Soviet color revolutions and the 2011 Arab Spring, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov wrote in February 2013 that the “consequences of new conflicts are comparable to those of a real war”; in many cases, nonmilitary methods “are substantially more effective than the power of arms,” and greater emphasis is placed on “political, economic, information, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary means” and “covert military measures,” including “information warfare and actions by special forces.” In this environment, “overt use of military force, often in the form of peacekeeping or crisis management, takes place only at a certain stage, mainly to achieve final success in a conflict.” With regard to the U.S.-Russia confrontation, another key feature has surfaced: asymmetry between the sides’ capabilities. POWER ASYMMETRIES AND ASYMMETRIC ACTIONS Although Gerasimov was referring to a hybrid war when discussing new means and methods of warfare, this analysis uses the newly fashionable term to describe the current U.S.-Russia confrontation. Unlike its Cold War predecessor, this conflict is asymmetrical. At least since the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the United States’ equal in terms of both nuclear and conventional military power. Even beyond its own vast land mass and immediate sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, it wielded considerable ideological power in many Western countries and in the Third World and presided over a system of alliances in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The Russian Federation, by contrast, has few formal allies, no satellite states, and a handful of protectorates, if one includes the self-proclaimed states of Abkhazia, Donbass, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. It has no ideology to compare with the comprehensive dogma of Marxism-Leninism, and although it is still a nuclear superpower, it lags far behind the United States in non-nuclear military capabilities. Economically, Russia—with its estimated 1.5 percent of the global gross domestic product—is a dwarf. Neither the balance nor the correlation of forces, however, will determine the outcome of this confrontation. Despite the glaring asymmetries in the national power of the two sides of the conflict, the course of events is not predetermined. As a nonlinear, highly asymmetrical conflict, the outcome likely will result from domestic developments in Russia or the United States or both. Both countries are facing serious problems that could prove decisive in the final calculations of the Hybrid War. The United States is going through a triple crisis of its political system, exemplified but not caused by the arrival of President Donald Trump and the virulent domestic opposition to him and his policies. A crisis of social values lies beneath this political crisis and points to a widening gap between the more liberal and the largely conservative parts of the country. At the same time, the United States faces a crisis within its own foreign policy as it struggles to reconcile the conflict between the more inward-looking U.S. national interest and the international liberal order of the U.S.-led global system. Russia, though outwardly stable, is approaching its own major crisis as the political regime created by Putin faces an uncertain future after the eventual departure of its figurehead. Putin’s Kremlin is already working on a political transition that would rejuvenate the elite and improve its competence and performance, but, at the same time, Russian society is also changing and Putin’s heirs cannot take its support for granted. Gross inequality, sluggish economic growth, low vertical mobility, and high-level corruption will present a range of serious challenges to the future Russian leadership. The eventual outcome of the Hybrid War could be reminiscent of the downfall of the Soviet Union, which was far less the result of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War than of a misguided effort to reform the Soviet Union itself. Russia might break down and break up again, or it might decide on a foreign policy more geared toward its economic needs than to a certain concept of world order. As for the United States, it might decide to limit its global commitments and redesign its international role as the world’s preeminent but no longer dominant state. Yet, in doing so, it will need to accept that its change in status will come with a certain price and that it will not be able to take advantage of the benefits of the position it once enjoyed. Asymmetries in power lead to asymmetric actions, which as Gerasimov suggested are intended to “neutralize the enemy’s superiority in warfare” or “identify and exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities.”5 By an order of magnitude—or more—Russia is outgunned, outmanned, and outspent by the combined forces of the United States and its allies. To stay in the fight, it must rely on its few comparative advantages and seek to use them to maximum effect. These advantages include the geographical proximity of some of the main theaters of operation, such as Crimea and eastern Ukraine, where Russia has escalation dominance; the Russian political system, which allows for secretive, swift, and decisive action; and Moscow’s willingness to take much higher risks in view of the disproportionally higher stakes involved for the Russian leadership and a national culture that historically has tolerated higher losses in defense or protection of the Motherland. Through swift decisions and actions, made without prior warning, Russia is capable of surprising its adversaries and keeping them off-balance. This situation promises an uncertain, hard-to-predict, and risky environment, where miscalculation can lead to incidents or collisions that, in turn, lead to escalation. Granted, these incidents would be of a different kind than the tank standoff at Berlin’s Checkpoint Charlie in late October 1961 or the Cuban Missile Crisis barely a year later. Escalation resulting from miscalculation would not be automatic, but the wider damage it could cause needs to be taken seriously. AVOIDING MISTAKES LEADING TO ESCALATION The Hybrid War is highly dynamic and, so far, has no agreed-upon rules. In this sense, it resembles the Cold War of the early 1950s rather than that of the 1970s. However, it is possible, up to a point, to avoid military escalation during the Hybrid War. U.S.-Russian antagonism does not mean that the two countries’ interests are in total opposition. Unlike in the second half of the twentieth century, neither party envisions a real shooting war against its adversary and neither wants to allow the situation to become uncontrollable. The most obvious ways to manage the confrontation are incident prevention, confidence building, and arms control. Incident prevention, on the face of it, should be easy. Since the early 1970s, Moscow and Washington have had agreements in place to avoid incidents, which in the Cold War days carried the risk of escalation to nuclear levels. Effective prevention requires a degree of professionalism, adequate safety measures, and reliable channels of communications. However, during a Hybrid War, these preconditions cannot be taken for granted. Acting from a position of relative weakness, Russia is likely to compensate for its inferior overall strength by raising the stakes of confrontation.

#### The plan solves ---

#### 1. Breakups and competition spur safeguards against Russian influence

Hendrickson and Galston, 17 (Clara Hendrickson and William A. Galston, Hendrickson is a Research Analyst - The Brookings Institution, Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Program, where he serves as a Senior Fellow. Former Acting Dean at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland., 12-6-2017, accessed on 8-11-2021, Brookings, "Big technology firms challenge traditional assumptions about antitrust enforcement", <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/12/06/big-technology-firms-challenge-traditional-assumptions-about-antitrust-enforcement/>)//Babcii

THE NEW TECHNOLOGY TRUSTS So while fear that big tech can wield excessive influence in our democracy may reflect broader misgivings outside the realm of antitrust law and enforcement, some political concerns about big tech appropriately fall under the purview of antitrust regulation. As Sally Hubbard, a Senior Editor at the Capitol Forum who covers monopolization issues, recently stated in an interview with Vox’s Sean Illing, “Companies like Facebook and Google have had an outsize effect on political discourse because of the ways their algorithms help to promote and spread fake news and propaganda. Even if it’s not their intent, their business model invariably contributes to this problem.” More competition between rival platforms would have introduced a greater number of algorithms for Russian operatives to navigate, and probably would have mitigated the impact of the fake news that successfully targeted voters during the 2016 U.S. election. Similarly, because the services offered by the likes of Google and Facebook are free (or low cost in the case of Amazon), tech companies have escaped the predatory pricing concerns typically triggered by anticompetitive high prices. However, Financial Times columnist Rana Foroohar has argued that we incur non-monetary costs when we use these services, handing over our attention and personal data. Of course these two examples do not immediately elicit a clear solution for antitrust enforcement reform one way or the other, but they do illustrate that the dynamics of the tech era will require an updated conception and application of current antitrust law. While what this looks like remains unclear, a consensus is emerging that the Chicago School consumer welfare framework, formulated by Robert Bork and Richard Posner among others, has failed to capture today’s market power. In a widely-read [note](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/amazons-antitrust-paradox) published in the Yale Law Journal, Lina Khan, a fellow at the Open Markets Institute, shows that the focus on low prices as the exclusive goal of antitrust cannot account for Amazon’s dominance.

#### 2. Separating platforms from commerce ends revenue capture and conflicted interests

Stoller, 19 (Matt Stoller, Matt Stoller is a fellow at the Open Markets Institute. He is writing a book on monopoly power in the 20th century for Simon and Schuster. Previously, he was a Senior Policy Advisor and Budget Analyst to the Senate Budget Committee. He also worked in the U.S. House of Representatives on financial services policy, 10-17-2019, accessed on 7-24-2021, The New York Times, "Tech Companies Are Destroying Democracy and the Free Press", https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/opinion/tech-monopoly-democracy-journalism.html)//Babcii

As the presidential election approaches, the cracks in the digital facade are once again showing. Facebook just removed an “I Love America” page, [run by Ukrainians](https://popular.info/p/massive-i-love-america-facebook-page), which pushed recycled pro-Trump imagery from the Internet Research Agency, the Russian group that tried [to influence the 2016 election](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html). [As it turned out](https://popular.info/p/an-interview-with-the-ukrainians), “I Love America” wasn’t state sponsored — the Ukrainians were just running the page for the advertising money. A similar page with falsified content, “Police Lives Matter,” is [now run](https://popular.info/p/huge-police-lives-matter-facebook) out of Kosovo. These two phony Facebook pages illustrate the crisis of the free press and democracy: Advertising revenue that used to go to quality journalism is now captured by big tech intermediaries, and some of that money now goes to dishonest, low-quality and fraudulent content. This is the first presidential election happening after the business model for journalism collapsed. Advertising revenue for print newspapers has fallen by two-thirds since 2006. From 2008 to 2018, the number of newspaper reporters [dropped 47 percent](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/09/u-s-newsroom-employment-has-dropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008/). Two-thirds of counties in America now have no daily newspaper, and [1,300 communities](https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2018/about-1300-u-s-communities-have-totally-lost-news-coverage-unc-news-desert-study-finds/) have lost all local coverage. Even outlets native to the web, like BuzzFeed and HuffPost, have laid off reporters. **This problem is a global** one; for example, in Australia from 2014 to 2018, the number of journalists in traditional print publications [fell by 20 percent](https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-%20final%20report.pdf). The signaling functions of news brands and the cultural barriers meant to guard against distorting effects of advertising have broken down. In their place, a dysfunctional information ecosystem has emerged, characterized by polarization, addiction and conspiracy theories. In Europe and in the United States, young men learn race science on YouTube. In Brazil, citizens learn [that Zika is spread by vaccines](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/americas/youtube-brazil.html?module=inline). As the Center for Humane Technology [puts it](https://humanetech.com/): “Today’s **tech platforms are caught in a race to the bottom of the brain stem** to extract human attention. It’s a race we’re all losing.” There are two drivers of this crisis. The first is the concentration of online advertising revenue in the hands of Google and Facebook — global monopolies sitting astride public discourse, diverting money that used to go to publishers to themselves. The second is an ethical breakdown — a xnatural consequence of advertising financing an information utility like a social network or search engine — which I call “conflicted communications.” It’s tempting to blame the rise of the internet for all of this, but it’s important to recognize that technology is shaped by law. Advertising, publishing and information distribution operate in publicly structured markets. In the past 40 years, the rules underlying these markets have undergone a radical reorganization. As the communications historian Richard John [argues](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674088139), for roughly 200 years (beginning with the [creation of the Post Office in 1791](https://www.amazon.com/Spreading-News-American-Postal-Franklin/dp/0674833422)), American policymakers generally sought to decentralize media power and keep communication networks neutral. In the late 1970s, policymakers reversed their presumptions. They relaxed antitrust law, eliminated the fairness doctrine and eventually allowed the creation of large media conglomerates through the [Telecommunications Act of 1996](https://www.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-act-1996). Enabled by a loose merger policy, there was a roll-up of the internet space. From 2004 to 2014, Google spent at least $23 billion [buying 145 companies](https://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/19/googles-best-and-worst-acquisitions.html), including the advertising giant DoubleClick. And since 2004, Facebook has spent a similar amount buying 66 companies, including [key acquisitions](https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20Digital%20Platforms%20Inquiry%20-%20Preliminary%20Report.pdf) allowing it to attain dominance in mobile social networking. None of these acquisitions were blocked as anti-competitive. Data is now the key input into advertising: If you know who is looking at an ad, that ad space [becomes](https://prospect.org/economy/digital-advertising-markets-really-work/) much more valuable. Google and Facebook now know who is looking at every ad, and their competitors for ad dollars — newspapers — do not. Further, newspapers now must also rely on Google and Facebook to reach their customers, and hand them valuable subscriber and reader data; when The Wall Street Journal refused to abide by Google’s formatting terms, Google removed it from its search ranks and the newspaper’s traffic [dropped](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-05/wsj-ends-google-users-free-ride-then-fades-in-search-results) by 44 percent. In other words, it wasn’t just technology but also a pro-concentration philosophy that shaped the information revolution of the 1990s and 2000s. Google and Facebook grew to control important information utilities, like general search, social networking and mapping. New forms of advertising — underpinned by unregulated use of data and sold through opaque and complex auctions — then undermined the bargaining leverage of publishers and enabled new forms of fraud using bots and falsified content. A result of these policy changes is a radical centralization of power over the flow of information. Tech platforms now control online advertising revenue, which is the primary source of financing for news. But this is not just a problem of the monopolization of an industry — these new monopolists are not simply more powerful media behemoths taking share from smaller publishers. Google and Facebook are not in the journalism business at all; they are in the communications business, running information utilities with revenue that used to go to journalism. Advertising financing presents an inherent conflict of interest, because advertising is a third party paying to manipulate someone. In traditional media, advertising can influence editorial choices. There are a series of ethical structures designed to inhibit excessive control of advertisers in media industries, a result of debates for hundreds of years among public figures on the nature of advertising and publishing. Some of these include the signaling effects of differentiated news brands, a diversity of news outlets, the separation of advertising and editorial departments, and guilds to protect journalistic integrity from publishing business interests. But such ethical debates have yet to occur around information utilities. Consequently, the manifestation of the distorting effect of advertising — addiction, manipulation, fraud, tearing of a collective social fabric — has been met with little cultural immunity, policy response or institutional defenses. Before Google became an enormous advertising company, the company’s co-founders — Sergey Brin and Larry Page — [noted this problem](http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html). They looked at the problematic search engine market of the 1990s — with companies offering advertisers the chance to pay to be listed as an organic search result — and argued that financing a search engine business through advertising was fundamentally corrupting. Such information utilities would then have an incentive to keep users on their properties so that they could keep selling more ads. They would also have **an incentive to self-deal, putting content in front of users that benefits the utility rather than the end user.** And they would have an incentive to surveil their users, so that they could target them more effectively. Mr. Brin and Mr. Page were right about the corrupting influence of advertising. This business model of conflicted communications is where the addiction, surveillance, fraud and clickbait come from. Unfortunately, we are living in the world they foresaw. The combination of these two dynamics — the concentration of power and the new ethical quandaries presented by the financing of information networks by advertising — has created a crisis for democracy. The monopolization of ad revenue starves legitimate outlets of financing. More subtly, the signaling functions of news brands and the dense cultural barriers meant to guard against distorting effects of advertising have broken down. The task of policymakers is now to put together the ethical structures to mitigate these conflicts. The collapse of journalism and democracy in the face of the internet is not inevitable. To save democracy and the free press, **we must eliminate Google and Facebook’s control over the information commons. That means decentralizing these markets and splitting information utilities from one another so that search, mapping, YouTube and other Google subsidiaries are separate companies**, and Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook **once again compete**. It also means barring or severely curtailing advertising on any of these platforms. Advertising revenue should once again flow to journalism and art. And people should pay directly for communications services, instead of paying indirectly by forgoing democracy.

### 1AC --- Advantage --- Resiliency

#### Advantage two is Resiliency:

#### Market concentration allows platform monopolies to ignore data and privacy protections

Stucke 18 Stucke is a co-founder of The Konkurrenz Group and a law professor at the University of Tennessee, ’18 (Maurice, “Here Are All the Reasons It’s a Bad Idea to Let a Few Tech Companies Monopolize Our Data,” <https://hbr.org/2018/03/here-are-all-the-reasons-its-a-bad-idea-to-let-a-few-tech-companies-monopolize-our-data>)

So, the divergence in antitrust enforcement may reflect differences over these data-opolies’ perceived harms. Ordinarily the harm from monopolies are higher prices, less output, or reduced quality. It superficially appears that data-opolies pose little, if any risk, of these harms. Unlike some pharmaceuticals, data-opolies do not charge consumers exorbitant prices. Most of Google’s and Facebook’s consumer products are ostensibly “free.” The data-opolies’ scale can also mean higher quality products. The more people use a particular search engine, the more the search engine’s algorithm can learn users’ preferences, the more relevant the search results will likely be, which in turn will likely attract others to the search engine, and the positive feedback continues. As Robert Bork argued, there “is no coherent case for monopolization because a search engine, like Google, is free to consumers and they can switch to an alternative search engine with a click.” How Data-opolies Harm But higher prices are not the only way for powerful companies to harm their consumers or the rest of society. Upon closer examination, data-opolies can pose at least eight potential harms. Lower-quality products with less privacy. Companies, antitrust authorities increasingly recognize, can compete on privacy and protecting data. But without competition, data-opolies face less pressure. They can depress privacy protection below competitive levels and collect personal data above competitive levels. The collection of too much personal data can be the equivalent of charging an excessive price. Data-opolies can also fail to disclose what data they collect and how they will use the data. They face little competitive pressure to change their opaque privacy policies. Even if a data-opoly improves its privacy statement, so what? The current notice-and-consent regime is meaningless when there are no viable competitive alternatives and the bargaining power is so unequal. Surveillance and security risks. In a monopolized market, personal data is concentrated in a few firms. Consumers have limited outside options that offer better privacy protection. This raises additional risks, including: Government capture. The fewer the number of firms controlling the personal data, the greater the potential risk that a government will “capture” the firm. Companies need things from government; governments often want access to data. When there are only a few firms, this can increase the likelihood of companies secretly cooperating with the government to provide access to data. China, for example, relies on its data-opolies to better monitor its population. Covert surveillance. Even if the government cannot capture a data-opoly, its rich data-trove increases a government’s incentive to circumvent the data-opoly’s privacy protections to tap into the personal data. Even if the government can’t strike a deal to access the data directly, it may be able to do so covertly. Implications of a data policy violation/security breach. Data-opolies have greater incentives to prevent a breach than do typical firms. But with more personal data concentrated in fewer companies, hackers, marketers, political consultants, among others, have even greater incentives to find ways to circumvent or breach the dominant firm’s security measures. The concentration of data means that if one of them is breached, the harm done could be orders of magnitude greater than with a normal company. While consumers may be outraged, a dominant firm has less reason to worry of consumers’ switching to rivals. Wealth transfer to data-opolies. Even when their products and services are ostensibly “free,” data-opolies can extract significant wealth in several ways that they otherwise couldn’t in a competitive

#### That spurs massive amounts of leakages, surveillance, and hacking

Kira, 21 (Beatriz Kira, Senior Research Associate at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, PhD in Economic Law and Political Economy from the University of São Paulo, and an MSc in Social Sciences of the Internet from the University of Oxford., Vikram Sinha, Sharmadha Srinivasan, 8-1-2021, "Regulating digital ecosystems: bridging the gap between competition policy and data protection", accessed 9-1-2021, https://academic.oup.com/icc/advance-article/doi/10.1093/icc/dtab053/6356942?login=true)

At the same time, weak competition and concentrated market power may lead to reduced levels of data protection (Kerber, 2016). Consumers’ privacy choices are limited in less competitive markets that are dominated by a few players. Their privacy preferences are likely to be better served in a market with several players (Esayas, 2018a). Where a few companies have dominance, they have little incentive to compete on data privacy and are more likely to engage in excessive data collection and offer less privacy protection than in a competitive market. Strong network effects and high switching costs would prevent users from looking for more privacy-friendly alternative platforms (Condorelli and Padilla, 2020). With fewer options to switch to, digital platforms could also collect more data and compensate users less than they would in a competitive market (Economides and Lianos, 2021). In data-driven markets, abuse of dominance takes place in new ways. The employment of highly tailored and segmented profiling technologies, such as microtargeting or geotagging, can enable a platform to restrict competition and prevent users’ access to certain goods or services based on their personal features. For example, in 2017, the EC launched an investigation to assess if certain video game companies were preventing consumers from having access to digital content based on their location or country of residence.14 This would be considered a geo-blocking practice, which uses consumers’ data to prevent them from enjoying cross-border choice and being able to buy computer games at competitive prices. According to a structuralist approach, platforms in direct competition with businesses that depend on them hold a privileged position for influencing the way the industry is structured and the value allocation between the industry players. Many of the biggest digital platforms are integrated across business lines so they operate and market their own goods and services on the same platform (e.g. Amazon and Google). As a result, such platforms have the means and incentives to exploit their structure to further entrench their dominance (Wu, 2018; Khan, 2019; Lianos, 2019).15 Increased market power allows firms to be more opaque about how they use the data they collect. For positive-price platforms, while the main revenue model may rest on subscriptions or the goods purchased from a seller (e.g. Netflix or Amazon retail), additional customer data are used to target marketing based on past purchasing returns, which gives a competitive advantage. Amazon, for example, reportedly uses data of third-party sellers to better pitch its own products as well as test new products and foreclose competition (Khan, 2017). With digital platforms that function as data monopolies, there is also a risk of greater surveillance and data leakages. When a small number of firms control a large amount of data, it is easier for governments to target them and gain access to the stored data, either by formal legal requests or through government hacking.16 For example, the use of contact tracing apps by governments in response to coronavirus-19 triggered a debate about the potential use of the large amounts of data collected in the aftermath of the pandemic (Tisné, 2020). Likewise, security breaches by ill-intentioned agents would expose a much greater amount of information when data are concentrated in the hands of a few companies (Stucke, 2018). If data are to be treated as a nonmonetary cost (as discussed in Section 2.2.1), it is possible to apply the logic of overcharging in positive-price markets—that is, when a supplier’s dominant market position allows it to impose costs that do not accurately reveal consumer preferences and valuation of the product. Kemp (2020) traces data overcharging to ‘concealed data practices’. The author argues that zero-price platforms suffer from deep information asymmetry regarding data transactions, with consumers unaware of the true scope of data extraction, the nature and scope of the data’s use, and the consequences. These issues of privacy and consent do matter to individuals despite literature on the ‘privacy paradox’—whereby users tend not to care about their privacy as much as they state and as revealed through their actual behavior (Barnes, 2006). As Solove (2021) points out, the privacy paradox is based on faulty assumptions where people’s privacy concerns are general in nature and cannot be assessed in very specific contexts.

#### Market concentration also spurs homogeneity which undermines system resiliency

Geer et al. 03, PhD, Chief Technology Officer and co-founder of AtStake, ’03 (Daniel, Rebecca Bace, Peter Gutmann, Perry Metzger, Charles P. Pfleeger, John S. Quarterman, Bruce Schneier, CyberInsecurity: The Cost of Monopoly, <https://cryptome.org/cyberinsecurity.htm>)

Computing is crucial to the infrastructure of advanced countries. Yet, as fast as the world's computing infrastructure is growing, security vulnerabilities within it are growing faster still. The security situation is deteriorating, and that deterioration compounds when nearly all computers in the hands of end users rely on a single operating system subject to the same vulnerabilities the world over. Most of the world’s computers run Microsoft’s operating systems, thus most of the world’s computers are vulnerable to the same viruses and worms at the same time. The only way to stop this is to avoid monoculture in computer operating systems, and for reasons just as reasonable and obvious as avoiding monoculture in farming. Microsoft exacerbates this problem via a wide range of practices that lock users to its platform. The impact on security of this lock-in is real and endangers society. Because Microsoft's near-monopoly status itself magnifies security risk, it is essential that society become less dependent on a single operating system from a single vendor if our critical infrastructure is not to be disrupted in a single blow. The goal must be to break the monoculture. Efforts by Microsoft to improve security will fail if their side effect is to increase user-level lock-in. Microsoft must not be allowed to impose new restrictions on its customers – imposed in the way only a monopoly can do – and then claim that such exercise of monopoly power is somehow a solution to the security problems inherent in its products. The prevalence of security flaw in Microsoft’s products is an effect of monopoly power; it must not be allowed to become a reinforcer. Governments must set an example with their own internal policies and with the regulations they impose on industries critical to their societies. They must confront the security effects of monopoly and acknowledge that competition policy is entangled with security policy from this point forward.

#### The risk of both are massive --- Only separating platforms from commerce prevents cascading system failure

Kahn, 19 (Lina Kahn, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School, Current chairman of the FTC, 2019, accessed on 9-2-2021, Columbialawreview, "THE SEPARATION OF PLATFORMS AND COMMERCE", <https://columbialawreview.org/content/the-separation-of-platforms-and-commerce/>)//babcii

System Resiliency. — As a growing share of online commerce and communications rely on dominant online platforms, the resiliency of platform infrastructure becomes paramount. Yet concentrating activity can also concentrate risk, creating the possibility that a single system crash could have **cascading effects**.588 [\*\*Start footnote 588\*\* For in-depth analysis of how excessive concentration can heighten system fragility, see generally Barry C. Lynn, End of the Line: The Rise and Coming Fall of the Global Corporation 11 (2005) (arguing that an essential network platform “can be viewed as **common property** that belongs to all of the companies that rely on it” and therefore, “no one, quite naturally, **is responsible** for **ensuring that the system is safe**”); Barry C. Lynn, Built To Break, Challenge, Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 87, 94–95 (describing a shutdown in Japanese automobile manufacturing following a 2007 earthquake, which disrupted operations at an industrial firm that produced an automobile part used by all Japanese automakers, and using this example to illustrate the problems that result when an entire industry utilizes the same infrastructure); Yossi Sheffi & Barry C. Lynn, Systemic Supply Chain Risk, Bridge, Fall 2014, at 22, 25–26 (noting how, given increasing reliance on “single ‘super’ suppliers” throughout the economy, “[a] strike, sabotage, financial problem, or cyberattack can shut down a supplier, . . . creating a systemic disruption”). For an argument for why antitrust analysis generally and merger enforcement specifically should take fragility and resiliency concerns into account, see Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the Importance of “Redundant” Competitors, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 58–63) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). \*\*End Footnote 588\*\*]For example, AWS leads the cloud computing market, capturing a greater share than its next three competitors combined.589 This level of concentration has at least two potential risks. One is general fragility. For example, a single outage at AWS a few years ago led Netflix, Reddit, Business Insider, and several other major websites to crash for five hours.590 The second risk is the security vulnerabilities created by monoculture. Homogeneity can render a system more susceptible to malware or hacks, a risk recognized in the context of computer systems.591 As more businesses come to use AWS as default computing power (the company counts among its clients the CIA592), the potential systemic ramifications are not trivial. Indeed, the prospect of Amazon winning a single-source contract for the Pentagon has prompted concerns that awarding the business to a single provider could increase cybersecurity risks.593 Analogous concerns raised by Google’s dominance have prompted policy officials to debate whether the company should be designated as “critical infrastructure.”594 Notably, these resiliency concerns are primarily responding to concentration, not integration. A vertical separation would not address the underlying issue, unless exiting an adjacent market would reduce exposure to risk.

#### Weak system resiliency causes nuclear war

Klare, 19 (Michael T. Klare, Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, "Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation," Arms Control Association, November 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)//Babcii

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13

The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing **widespread disorder** in both countries and **generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks**. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14

#### It goes nuclear even if attacks are unsuccessful

Vladimir Orlov 20, Founder & Director of the PIR Center, President of the Trialogue Club International, Head of the Center for Global Trends and International Organizations at the Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Co-Founder and Academic Supervisor of the International Dual Degree MA Program in Nonproliferation and Global Security Studies, MGIMO University, Professor at MGIMO University, author (or coauthor) of more than a dozen books and monographs and more than three hundred research papers, articles, and essays, publishes his views in Russian and foreign periodicals, “‘No Holds Barred’ and the New Vulnerability: Are We in for a Re-Run of the Cuban Missile Crisis in Cyberspace?,” SSRN Scholarly Paper, ID 3538078, Social Science Research Network, 02/14/2020, papers.ssrn.com, doi:10.2139/ssrn.3538078

Not hundred per cent of the dialogue has been frozen, fortunately. Certain informal, mostly offthe-record, meetings of US and Russian experts on cyber agenda continue taking place, both through Track 2 and Track 1.5. One of the most intellectually stimulating meetings, with frank exchanges, took place in Vienna in December 2018. The report produced after the meeting stressed “the significant risk […] that cyber-attacks could conceivably lead to a military escalation that may further trigger a nuclear weapons exchange, a fact that became more explicit with the adoption of the current Nuclear Posture Review. This issue gets complicated given that third parties may have the capabilities to invoke a cyber conflict between Russia and the United States. Whether a country or a non-state actor, they could put the two countries on the verge of an armed conflict by attacking critical infrastructure of either of them and making it look as if the aggressor were the other one”[22]. However, one should have no illusion: such informal meetings may be fully fruitful only when their reports and policy recommendations are utilized by the governments. And for that, a warmer climate in bilateral relations is a must. So far, we see exactly the opposite: mercury falling to freezing levels.

Risk of cyber clashes growing into a chaotic global cyber war has been emphasized by the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in his Agenda for Disarmament: “Malicious acts in cyberspace are contributing to diminishing trust among States… States should implement the recommendations elaborated under the auspices of the General Assembly, which aim at building international confidence and greater responsibility in the use of cyberspace.[23]” However, as the members of the US-Russian Track 1.5 working group on strategic stability recently concluded, “without a constructive dialogue on cyber issues between the United States and Russia, the world would most likely fail to agree on any norms of responsible behavior of states in cyber space”[24].

Do we really have to survive a cyber equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis to realize the importance of achieving some kind of agreement on cyber issues, and on the broader agenda of international information security?[25] Or is that kind of talk plain old alarmism?

I don’t want to sound a fatalist, but I am even less keen on sounding like an ostrich that’s buried its head in the sand. We cannot ignore the obvious: whether the world’s most powerful actors like it or not, the world is sliding to another major crisis like the one in 1962. The cyber war is already raging. There are no rules of engagement in that war. The uncertainty is high. The spiral of tension is getting out of control. The cyber arms race is gaining momentum. And there are no guarantees that the next crisis will be controllable, or that it will result in a catharsis as far as international information security regulation is concerned. There’s no telling what will happen once the cyber genie is out of the bottle.

### 1AC --- Advantage --- Europe

#### Advantage three is Europe:

#### Platform monopolies drive an existential fear of market takeover in Europe

Suominen, 20 (Kati Suominen , Kati Suominen is an adjunct fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program; Dr. Suominen holds a B.A. from the University of Arkansas, an M.A. from Boston University, an M.B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, and a Ph.D. from the University of California, San Diego. She is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations., 10-26-2020, accessed on 7-20-2021, Csis, "On the Rise: Europe’s Competition Policy Challenges to Technology Companies", https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-europes-competition-policy-challenges-technology-companies)//Babcii

WHAT IS **DRIVING EUROPEAN PROPOSALS**? Europe’s **antitrust** policy enforcement actions form part of a series of EU steps that have hampered U.S. companies over the past few years. Among them are the European Union’s 2018 copyright law forcing U.S. platforms to increasingly police content posted on their sites and adjudicate freedom of expression; the European Union’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that has cost American as well as European businesses billions of dollars to implement; Europe’s proposals to monitor data used for artificial intelligence applications; and several European nations’ [digital services taxes](https://taxfoundation.org/digital-tax-europe-2020/) that primarily impact U.S. technology companies by shifting corporate income taxes for digital services to where they are consumed, as opposed to where they are developed. In part, Europe’s proposals for greater antitrust powers against technology companies represent a continuation of a history of cases where European enforcers and courts applied [an array of tests](https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-071_goals_of_eu_competition_law_and_digital_economy.pdf) positing that a certain behavior is anticompetitive—such that it hurts potential competitors, consumer choice, or innovation. Indeed, the Commission’s interventionist approach has long contrasted with U.S. antitrust enforcers and courts that have largely accepted market leadership and consumer loyalty earned through hard competition and risky investments. For U.S. enforcers, protecting consumer welfare (or efficiency and lower cost)—rather than potential competitors—has been their North Star. There are, however, a number of reasons why Europe is acting now to establish a stricter muscular antitrust policy. First, European antitrust officials, much like policymakers in the United States, report being under great political **pressure to “do something” about big tech**nology companies. [Polls suggest](https://bdaily.co.uk/articles/2020/08/26/uk-consumers-put-a-price-on-privacy-half-would-pay-more-to-do-business-with-an-organisation-committed-to-protecting-their-personal-data) that most Europeans support the Commission’s actions against Google and other U.S. technology companies and worry about their personal data getting in the hands of America technology companies and, in the wake of the Snowden revelations, the U.S. government. Antitrust officials are also reported to be **pressured by local**, less digitized **businesses that struggle to compete with** the **digital platforms**, and too often rush to act on populist pressures, despite having no clear empirical basis. Second, Europe is using antitrust to clear space for its own companies in sectors it considers to be in Europe’s comparative advantage, such as financial services, the Internet of Things (IoT), smart factories and smart homes, and healthcare. Europeans have failed to seize on the various technology waves that brought us smartphones, cloud computing, search, and social media, and they lack the kind of market-leading platforms that the United States and China have produced such as Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Google, Alibaba, and WeChat. Germany’s SAP, the Netherland’s Adyen, and Sweden’s Spotify have [barely 3 percent of the market capitalization](http://www.netzoekonom.de/plattform-oekonomie/) of major tech platforms compared to 68 percent held by U.S. companies. European policymakers are now concerned that **U.S. companies are going beyond their traditional** swim **lanes** of social networking, ecommerce, and search and moving into “European” sectors. After all, U.S. technology companies often look to apply their technologies in new sectors: Apple started its own credit card and TV service; Google bought Fitbit to get into the wearable tech market and; Amazon has become a global freight forwarder and air cargo carrier. In a more frontal attack, Tesla is now striking at Europe’s leadership in high-end, tech-driven vehicles, [looking to build a gigafactory outside of Berlin](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/business/tesla-elon-musk-berlin.html). Europe needs to pre-empt mergers that would enable these giants to reap even more **market share in Europe** or outright force American companies to open their proprietary data to European firms, so they can accelerate the build-out of valuable algorithms in new markets.

#### They’ll respond in kind with expanded antitrust that causes digital protectionism

Suominen, 20 (Kati Suominen , Kati Suominen is an adjunct fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program; Dr. Suominen holds a B.A. from the University of Arkansas, an M.A. from Boston University, an M.B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, and a Ph.D. from the University of California, San Diego. She is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations., 10-26-2020, accessed on 7-20-2021, Csis, "On the Rise: Europe’s Competition Policy Challenges to Technology Companies", https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-europes-competition-policy-challenges-technology-companies)//Babcii

Both the United States and Europe are currently debating the merits of these arguments—including whether antitrust law should be retailored to address them. In the **United States, antitrust enforcement officials and courts** have, in general, **accepted market leadership earned through competition** in the marketplace, as long as it leads to greater efficiencies and cost savings for consumers. In contrast, the European Commission antitrust officials have tended to favor protecting potential competitors, even if market leaders have managed to outperform competitors and gain consumer loyalty through their ingenuity and smart acquisitions. One of the outcomes of this approach has yielded recent investigations and multi-billion-dollar fines by the European Commission on American companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon for supposedly violating European competition policy rules. Today, the business climate for American technology companies is **heating up in Europe**. Concerned about Europe’s lack of competitiveness in the global digital economy, both the European Commission and various EU member states are looking to significantly **expand their antitrust powers** to curb large technology companies. One way they do this is by blocking pre-eminent firms’ planned mergers and acquisitions and forcing them to provide access to the data they have gathered—to the benefit of European competitors. Europe’s hardening antitrust stance poses significant problems to **U.S. business interests in Europe’s** giant digital market—Europe’s business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce sales alone are climbing [past $850](https://ecommercenews.eu/ecommerce-in-europe-e717-billion-in-2020/) [billion this year](https://ecommercenews.eu/ecommerce-in-europe-e717-billion-in-2020/). The Commission’s approach also risks **digital protectionism** and **politicization** of antitrust enforcement, which could have **significant implications for trade** relations between the United States and the European Union and for many emerging markets’ thinking about competition policy issues.

#### That locks in a combative nature over the digital economy

Barshefsky, 20 (Charlene Barshefsky, Charlene Barshefsky served as United States Trade Representative, the country's top trade negotiator, from 1997 to 2001. She was the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative from 1993 to 1997. JD from colombus school of law, 8-2-2020, accessed on 7-21-2021, Financial Times, "EU digital protectionism risks damaging ties with the US", https://www.ft.com/content/9edea4f5-5f34-4e17-89cd-f9b9ba698103)//Babcii

Europe should reconsider its digital sovereignty agenda and instead pursue greater regulatory co-operation with the US. Demonising US technology companies hinders efforts to address the foremost challenge for both sides with respect to the digital economy: China. Chinese protectionism — which fuses state and Communist party control, and creates subsidies and intellectual property theft on an unparalleled scale — poses **an existential threat to** a vibrant digital **economy**. For example, China is pressing for a new centrally controlled internet, which the US and EU oppose. If Europe persists in its approach, US policymakers will have **no choice but to treat it as a strategic threat**. In the near term, it is **difficult to imagine** that the US will be able to strike **a meaningful trade deal** with the EU — a priority of both sides for many years — so long as the EU pursues the techno-nationalist moves aimed at the US. The Europeans **need to reverse course** before the economic and geopolitical **damage cannot be undone**.

#### It’s the core issue --- Tech antitrust opens the floodgates

Giarda et al., 21 (Raffaele Giarda et al., head of Baker McKenzie's Technology Media & Telecoms Industry Group New York University (M.C.J.) (1994)Columbia University (Summer Program American Law) (1990)University of Rome (J.D., with honors) (1989), 2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Bakermckenzie, "TMT Looking Ahead", <https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2021/01/tmt-looking-ahead-2021.pdf?la=en)//Babcii>

The long-mooted increased regulation of digital services and markets in Europe landed in December 2020 in the form of two draft regulations, the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. In 2021, digital service providers will be focused on preparing their businesses for the changes ahead, as both proposals navigate the legislative process. The DSA and DMA will not be the only items **near the top of** corporate **agendas in 2021**. Others are likely to include monitoring the continued efforts to find international consensus on tax reforms for the digital economy and addressing the impact of any further developments in the ongoing technology-focused trade wars. AT A GLANCE The EU Digital Services Act: What does the future hold? The European Commission has published its landmark draft new rules applicable to digital services (the Digital Services Act). The DSA shares common themes with the Digital Markets Act (see below) in particular (re) assigning liability or responsibility for possible online harms and a push for even greater transparency from market players. We examine what is actually new for TMT industry players and what lies ahead in these proposals which cover key areas, including safe harbours, notice and take down, know-your-trader requirements, reporting obligations and annual reviews of systemic risks by very large platforms (as defined in the DSA). The EU Digital Markets Act: New rules for platforms. Published alongside the proposed Digital Services Act, the proposals in the Digital Markets Act focus on the largest platforms (gatekeepers) which supply "core platform services" and seek to address what the European Commission perceives as **power asymmetries between platforms**, their business users and end users. Another area of focus is around general market structure — to ensure markets remain "fair and contestable". We look at the definition and role of gatekeepers and the key obligations that will apply under the DMA as well as the road ahead. Trade wars and protectionism — Digital sovereignty under attack? **The** TMT **sector is at the center of disruptive global trade** wars as **geopolitics collide with new technologies and economies are increasingly driven by technological innovation**. Examples include the use of **export controls** to protect "crown jewel" technology, **import restrictions** and **tariffs**, procurement bans and **foreign investment controls** which target key industry players on the basis of perceived national security concerns and **in pursuit of digital sovereignty**. As the concerns underlying these measures are deeply rooted and change is unlikely at the macro level in the short term, we provide an overview of the most important challenges TMT businesses are facing.

#### Europe is key determinant of the future of digital protectionism --- Collaboration is a counterweight against authoritarian regimes

Moghior, 21 (Cosmina Moghior, Cosmina is a Denton Fellow with the Transatlantic Leadership program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)., 8-11-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, CEPA, "Protectionism Threatens To Torpedo The Transatlantic Technology Alliance | CEPA", https://cepa.org/protectionism-threatens-to-torpedo-the-transatlantic-technology-alliance/)//Babcii

Europe similarly is **determined to build its own tech** capacities. It promotes the concept of [digital sovereignty](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/651992/EPRS_BRI(2020)651992_EN.pdf) aimed at providing the continent the capacity to make “autonomous technological choices.” Several projects promote domestic production of critical technologies ranging from next-generation mobile phone production to quantum computing. Public funds already are being spent on the European cloud computing project GAIA-X aims to break the U.S. stranglehold on cloud computing. While Europe insists that its actions are not protectionist, designed instead to promote and safeguard European values, GAIA-X aims to ensure data protection and limit access of U.S. intelligence to European data. U.S. tech giants including Amazon, Google, and Microsoft have been invited to join, but are banned from joining the board. The **U.S.** is home to the world’s largest Internet companies and **fears that European regulatory measures will discriminate against them**. Plans for a European “digital” tax – put on hold to secure a global corporate tax reform – would disproportionately impact American companies that provide digital services in Europe. A separate Digital Markets Act proposal under consideration at the European Parliament addresses unfair practices of the so-called “gatekeepers,” that operate “core platform services.” Most of the targeted companies will likely be American, beginning with giants Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon. Europe and the U.S. **need to step back from pursuing their protectionist instincts**, which threatens to allow [China’s increasing inroads into the digital market](https://www.brookings.edu/research/untangling-the-web-why-the-us-needs-allies-to-defend-against-chinese-technology-transfer/). **Beijing is making** [**investments**](https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/) **on all continents** on projects ranging from education to [critical infrastructure](https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/727852/DIIS_RP_2016_8_WEB.pdf). Many **countries are turning to China for support** and guidance on technological development while the U.S. and the EU focus on their domestic anxieties and ambitions. A transatlantic tech **alliance could provide the blueprint for offering a viable alternative to** Chinese inroads in **the developing world**. Europe and the U.S. need to coordinate against the export of authoritarian practices on the Internet. They can only do this by **dropping the push for** Buy American and **European Digital Sovereignty.**

#### Otherwise, authoritarians will cement internet protectionism globally

DuPont, 20 (Sam DuPont, Deputy Director, Digital Innovation and Democracy Initiative, Washington, DC, 11-23-2020, accessed on 1-18-2021, Wita, "The Biden Administration Should Pursue a Digital Trade Agreement", https://www.wita.org/blogs/biden-digital-trade-agreement/)//Babcii

A forward-looking **digital trade agreement would guarantee** that all these services and more can compete **internationally**—and that the data upon which they depend can flow freely across borders. Successfully negotiating such an agreement with a large group of **trading partners would** be a boon to U.S. businesses and workers, and there is every reason to believe it would be a political winner on both sides of the aisle. What is more, it would also **advance** the **geostrategic interests** of the United States. An agreement that helps ensure the global digital economy defaults toward free commerce, the free exchange of ideas, and the free flow of data will help the United States and its allies confront and compete with China. At home, the Chinese government has implemented a top-down, repressive model for controlling the internet. And it has used negotiations, influence, and raw power to advocate this model overseas—seeking to build a [coalition of countries](https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-vision-for-cyber-sovereignty-and-the-global-governance-of-cyberspace/) with separate, sovereign internets characterized by greater government control over information—in order to validate its domestic approach and enhance its global influence. **The campaign is working: Governments around the world have followed China’s lead by restricting the free flow of information**, blocking online services, and **fragmenting the internet** along national boundaries. Earlier this year, Freedom House documented a [10th consecutive year of decline](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2020/pandemics-digital-shadow) in global “internet freedom,” and the U.S. trade representative cataloged an ever-growing [list of barriers to digital trade](https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2020/march/fact-sheet-2020-national-trade-estimate-strong-binding-rules-advance-digital-trade). It is not enough for the United States to play defense against these efforts—the Biden administration should advance a proactive strategy to ensure an open, global internet with rules that are rooted in democratic values. One of the most effective ways the Biden administration can pursue this goal is by negotiating enforceable rules and commitments on digital trade that bind together a large group of countries with shared values and common interests. A digital trade agreement should be built around rules that guarantee the free flow of data, prohibit data localization requirements, and ban unfair policies that discriminate against foreign digital products and services.

#### Two impacts ---

#### First --- Digital Trade --- Digital protectionism undermines the future of globalization --- Getting Europe on board is key

GCGS, 21 (GCGS, Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4-12-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Council on Foreign Relations, "The Rise of Digital Protectionism", https://www.cfr.org/report/rise-digital-protectionism)//Babcii

Despite the limitations brought about by Europe’s digital **restrictions**, participants largely agreed that Europe is more an irritant than **a major threat** and that the EU could help the United States push back against **Chinese digital protectionism**. A Digital Economy Drives Globalization Barriers to the free flow of data and digital information are consequential to the United States, participants said, because the global digital economy has quickly become a large part of cross-border trade flows. Participants estimated that cross-border data and digital flows account for between $2.8 trillion and $4 trillion of the $7 trillion to $15 trillion in total cross-border flows of goods and services. Moreover, although **cross-border flows in traditional goods** and services **flatlined** after the 2008 financial crisis, **data and digital flows have continually grown**, increasing eighty-fold since 2005. Participants noted that the **digital economy is the sole part of globalization that is still proceeding** apace and is more diffuse than traditional globalization, given the active role that smaller firms and smaller countries play. One participant argued that the digital economy is “shifting the nature of globalization,” by deepening cross-border trade in virtual goods even as growth in physical trade has been nearly stagnant. New technologies are creating economic opportunities, but **creeping protectionism**, especially in China, **could** **threaten** U.S. competitiveness in **critical sectors**. Participants highlighted massive Chinese investment in semiconductors, for example, as well as China’s dominance of the supply chains for fifth-generation mobile phones, not to mention Chinese determination to stake out a leading position in sectors such as AI, robotics, electric and autonomous vehicles, and biotechnology. China’s digital approach, one participant noted, has already resulted in its dominance of crucial sectors, “and they will dominate going forward.” But It Affects the Old Economy, Too Digital protectionism does not just pose a risk to U.S. competitiveness in sectors at the center of the future economy, it also threatens traditional sectors such as manufacturing, energy, and agriculture. Participants noted that advanced manufacturing has a large and growing data component: 3-D printing and digital manufacturing, for example, rely on cross-border data flows as well as a data-intensive research and development program. Traditional sectors such as agriculture are seeing a growing role for data, for example, in biotechnology and the development of new strains of seeds. Likewise, extractive industries and the energy sector are being transformed to rely increasingly on data, from geological big data crunching that enabled the hydraulic fracturing revolution to global shipping that is becoming increasingly automated. In that sense, some participants suggested, China’s digital protectionism, while boosting its dominance of high-tech sectors, could backfire in other areas. The rise of big data across a growing number of sectors is helped by jurisdictions such as the United States that allow unfettered data flows. Europe’s tough privacy laws also discourage innovation among technology firms; data localization requirements push tech startups to American shores, where compliance costs are lower. One participant suggested differentiating and regulating data—from anonymous industrial data to regular user information, to extremely sensitive, personal information such as health records—according to its sensitivity. Maintaining cross-border data flows with few government restrictions will be **important as the digital transformation plays out** in traditional sectors. As one participant put it, networks matter: an economy that tries to insulate itself from global data flows by throwing up restrictions to cross-border data-sharing risks cutting itself off rather than protecting its national champions.

#### Digital globalization prevents global war

Dr. Asma Iqbal & Muhammad Rafi Khan 21, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Government Graduate College for Women Samanabad; Lecturer/Research Officer at Minhaj University Lahore, “Power and Interdependence with Internet,” Pakistan Social Sciences Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pgs. 1142-1153, 3/30/21, https://pssr.org.pk/issues/v5/1/power-and-interdependence-with-internet.pdf

Interdependence

Reflecting a softer image of power and extending its domains to global social structures, interdependence is a multidimensional term, that gained traction with the emergence of the concept of globalization. It refers to a state, or a condition, that compels two or more actors to seek cooperation. For such cooperation, the absence of enmity is not a requirement. There are many examples of interdependence between fierce enemies, like Pakistan and India, China and India, and Russia and the US. The goals of this interdependence are to fulfill domestic and international deficiencies for national interest, and sometimes, international interest. The presence of Russia and the US in the Security Council, where both take decisions together in international interest, and can also veto any move for their own or their ally’s national interest.

The world today has mostly been eradicating the threats of war and becoming increasingly interdependent. Their actions are mostly based on the cost- benefit ratio. For instance, if a state must choose between war and trade and applying the statistical models for a complete understanding of both before deciding, the trade will supersede in choice over the war in most cases. That is why even enemies are doing trade, while the war of words also gains traction. This is because the cost of war is higher, and the benefit of trade is higher. The democratic peace theory and the McDonald Peace theory exist in almost the same domains, where political relationship and economic connectivity, both are eradicating scenarios of a possible war.

As an effective tool of soft power, the interdependence has shattered the isolation of introverted peoples and merged them with vibrant, dynamic, and socially linked societies. It relies on multidimensional mediums to avoid conflicts, increase connectivity, and inculcates multilateralism. Among these, the Internet is the most obvious, effective and resourceful medium that “frees us from geographic fetters and brings us together in topic-based communities that are not tied down to any specific place. Ours is a networked, globalized society connected by new technologies” (Dentzel, 2014).

The internet, coinciding with matters related to power, is a world of unknown depth. It is the most effective tool of connectivity in this modern world. It can also be designated as a doorway between traditional unilaterality and a multilateral world. It boosted interdependence and opened new horizons of connectivity and cooperation. Therefore, the virtual age has cut the distances short and challenged the hardships of the physical world with a counterbalance, depicted in the figure below.

#### Second --- Connectivity --- internet connectivity solves every impact

Tony Blair 21, Former prime minister of Great Britain and founder and executive chairman of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “The Progressive Case for Universal Internet Access: How to Close the Digital Divide by 2030,” 3/2/21, https://institute.global/policy/progressive-case-universal-internet-access-how-close-digital-divide-2030

Today, the internet is the beating heart of the world. And just as the roads, railways and canals provided the arteries for commerce in the Industrial Revolution, today’s network infrastructure is the circulatory system on which much of modern life depends. Without it, the ramifications of Covid-19 would have been far more severe.

That we have been able to use the internet to mitigate the impact of the pandemic is a small relief, but the Covid-19 crisis has emphasised the importance of everyone being connected in the future. Eradicating extreme poverty, solving the global education crisis, building better health-care systems and responding to pandemics effectively all require connectivity. For low-income countries, being largely excluded from the exponential potential of the internet means that they cannot transform their nations. It is extraordinary that today half the world remains offline.

Closing the digital divide by 2030 should be one of the primary global policy priorities. Accelerating internet expansion will drive economic growth and enable progress and – as this report from my Institute demonstrates – the benefits of investment vastly offset the costs. It outlines the urgent action required on stimulating demand, regulatory reform and greater global coordination, and how a new digital coalition needs to be formed to transform opportunity and access for billions of people.

But prioritising internet access is not only about poverty alleviation. During these past years of isolationist and unilateralist policymaking by Western governments, China has been taking a more dominant role in developing economies. It has been investing in digital hardware infrastructure, taking an active role within international bodies and influencing the standards and values that underpin the internet.

This requires strong global leadership. Collaborating with China, as well as competing. Stewarding the right global coalitions around investment to achieve universal internet access. Leadership with the vision, commitment and confidence to establish the internet for a prosperous and inclusive global society.

We’ve lost our way on this in recent years, but an open and connected world will be the lifeblood for our future growth. It’s time that we make it a reality.

#### Only global cooperation sustained through internet connectivity can prevent existential threats

- Disease, natural disasters, state collapse and limits of growth

Eagleman 10 (David Eagleman is a neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine, where he directs the Laboratory for Perception and Action and the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law and author of Sum (Canongate). Nov. 9, 2010, “Six ways the internet will save civilization,”  
 <http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no>)//Babcii

Many great civilizations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. Usually this results from: **natural disasters, resource depletion, economic meltdown, disease,** poor information flow and corruption. But we’re luckier than our predecessors because we command a technology that no one else possessed: a rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the internet. I propose that there are six ways in which **the net** has vastly **reduced the threat of societal collapse. Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence** One of our more dire prospects for collapse is an infectious-disease epidemic. Viral and bacterial epidemics precipitated the fall of the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of the Native Americans. The internet can be our key to survival because the ability to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce host density below the tipping point required for an epidemic. If we are well prepared when an epidemic arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in which microbes fail due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us. The **internet will predict natural disasters** We are witnessing the downfall of slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV stations to learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-phone pictures, updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped: the internet carried news about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could. In this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded reporters on every block, and the news shockwave kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety, well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount Vesuvius. If the Indian Ocean had the Pacific’s networked tsunami-warning system, South-East Asia would look quite different today. Discoveries are retained and shared Historically, critical information has required constant rediscovery. Collections of learning -- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation -- have fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster. Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And information that survives often does not spread. Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe. By the time the idea reached North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed. The net solved the problem. New discoveries catch on immediately; information spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in their fortification against risk. Tyranny is mitigated **Censorship of ideas** was a familiar spectre in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press, airwaves and copying machines in the USSR, Romania, Cuba, **China**, Iraq **and elsewhere**. In many cases, such as Lysenko’s agricultural despotism in the USSR, it **directly contributed to** the **collapse** of the nation. Historically, **a more successful strategy has been** to confront **free speech** with free speech -- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of every nation, the bloggers of every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and impartiality -- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by **some governments to build firewalls**, it’s **clear** that this benefit of **the net requires constant vigilance**. Human capital is vastly increased Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet far fewer than one per cent of the world’s population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama who has educational opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a smaller pool of problem solvers. **The net** opens the gates education to anyone with a computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the world’s knowledge -- from the webs of Wikipedia to the curriculum of MIT’s OpenCourseWare. The new human capital **will serve us well when we confront existential threats** we’ve never imagined before. Energy expenditure is reducedSocietal collapse can often be understood in terms of an **energy budget**: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues. This has taken the form of **deforestation or soil erosion**; currently, the worry involves **fossil-fuel depletion**. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease. Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons -- as seen in the transition from the post to email. Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving around, not least because of tight packaging and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet -- but these costs are less than the wood, coal and oil that would be expended for the same quantity of information flow. The tangle of events that triggers societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not address. But vast, networked communication can be an antidote to several of the most deadly **diseases threatening civilisation**. The next time your coworker laments internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us.

#### The plan solves ---

#### 1. Leadership --- The plan restores US leadership over big tech -- Only the fed can assuage Europe’s fear

Wheeler, 21 (Tom Wheeler, Tom Wheeler is a visiting fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution. Former chariman of the Chairman of the FCC., 2-10-2021, accessed on 8-18-2021, Brookings, "A focused federal agency is necessary to oversee Big Tech", <https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-focused-federal-agency-is-necessary-to-oversee-big-tech/)//Babcii>

A less obvious challenge presented by **the fed**eral government’**s failure** to effectively oversee the dominant digital companies is how it has left American companies unprotected in regard to the policies of other nations, and even individual American states. The United States is a worldwide leader in digital products and services for many reasons, but most notably because of its uniform market of 325 million consumers in which to develop products, products that are then widely available to an interconnected world. Such an advantage is [threatened](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/26/the-tragedy-of-tech-companies-getting-the-regulation-they-want/) when the absence of federal government policy leadership opens the door for policies to be determined by others. In an interconnected world, the absence of national oversight and leadership **leaves U.S. companies exposed to rules made by other nations**. Because of this absence, there is little American input. Similarly, the **absence of a national policy encourages state governments** to develop their own answers to pressing digital economy questions—answers that run the risk of diminishing the advantage of a uniform national marketplace. States as diverse as [California](https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa) and [Vermont](https://www.vpr.org/post/public-utility-commission-vermont-can-regulate-internet-telecommunications#stream/0) are adopting their own approaches to internet governance, while **foreign nations are filling the leadership void** internationally. The European Union proposed a [**Digital Services Act**](https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-services-act-package) **to regulate the behavior** of online companies. The United Kingdom proposed the creation of a [new digital watchdog](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-regulation-cooperation-forum). Italy [announced](https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN27D0MM) an investigation into Google’s advertising market activities. Germany is [investigating](https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-germany-competition/german-watchdog-launches-new-investigation-into-amazon-report-idUKKBN27D2OO) Amazon’s relationships with third-party sellers. China went so far as to attempt to push a [new internet architecture](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/nato-warns-new-authoritarian/) through the U.N.’s International Telecommunications Union. **American market** oversight **policies have traditionally been the North Star** in the development of international technology policy.[[7]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-focused-federal-agency-is-necessary-to-oversee-big-tech/#footnote-7) Where there is **no policy**, however, **there can be no pole star**. By being absent from the field, the federal government has walked away from a history of American leadership.

#### 2. Consultation --- Speed and clarity over platform monopolies allow the FTC to get Europe to back down

Dorpe, 21 (Simon Van Dorpe, Simon Van Dorpe is a competition reporter in Brussels, co-author of Politico's weekly Fair Play Newsletter and occasionally reports on Belgian politics., 7-2-2021, accessed on 7-21-2021, POLITICO, "What Vestager can teach Lina Khan on antitrust", https://www.politico.eu/article/margrethe-vestager-lina-khan-meeting/)//Babcii

3. **Need for speed** A **broad consensus** exists among antitrust lawyers, regulators and others who follow the issue that Europe’s Google cases, particularly those on its search engine, have progressed too slowly. This is particularly problematic in fast-moving digital markets as rivals cannot survive as long. “The Commission was **sending an ambulance to a funeral**,” is how Luther Lowe, senior vice president of public policy at Yelp, has put it. Yelp, the online review site, has complained to both EU and U.S. authorities about [Google’s treatment](https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-failed-to-tame-google-can-the-us-do-any-better/) of rivals. Vestager can relate about the many ways in which these cases can be delayed. In the Google Shopping case, for example, Vestager's predecessor Joaquín Almunia spent a lot of time negotiating a settlement with Google that in the end did not receive the backing of the other EU commissioners. 4. What cases can do (and where rules are needed) The takeaways from the antitrust cases brought by the European Commission and a number of national competition authorities — and the [**pressure**](https://www.politico.eu/?p=1136434) **from EU countries — have led** Vestager under her new digital powers **to** propose **a** legal **framework to regulate the behavior of large online firms**. Unlike antitrust enforcement, which looks at whether firms have breached broad rules in the past, the new, more prescriptive rules are aimed at forcing the companies to self-regulate before any potential anti-competitive behavior could occur. This is where Khan can engage on an equal footing, as she was deeply involved in the [proposal](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/06/house-democrats-antitust-overhaul-big-tech-426840) of **a massive overhaul of U.S. laws to rein in Big Tech**. Last week, the House Judiciary Committee [passed](https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2021/06/24/house-panel-approves-plan-to-help-break-up-tech-giants-1386987) the first package of those bills. The interaction **might help** Khan prioritize which practices could most effectively be dealt with through competition enforcement. 5. Breaking up the companies Despite calls from complainants and politicians to break the companies up, Vestager has repeatedly said that was only a measure of last resort. That is also her position for the new gatekeeper rules. "We’ll have the power to fine gatekeepers that breach their obligations — but just as importantly, the proposal would make it possible to impose remedies ... that, if necessary, could go all the way to breaking up the company," she [said](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/vestager/announcements/defending-competition-digital-age_en) last week, adding that "of course, in this case, a structural remedy, where the company has to sell part of its business, would be very much a last resort — just as it is with our antitrust rules." Breaking up companies is easier in the U.S. than in the EU, though a court hasn't ordered that as a remedy for anticompetitive behavior since AT&T in the 1980s. "U.S. jurisprudence makes absolutely clear that structural reorganization is part of the conventional toolkit of abuse of dominance remedies in the U.S.," Kovacic said. Vestager’s reticence may not only be due to the difficulty of splitting up monopolies under the current state of EU law, but also because Europe is not eager to lose political capital by **doing what it believes should have been done in the U.S.**

### 1AC --- Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially increase prohibitions on anti-competitive business practices by the private sector by expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws to include standards against owning and competing on the same platform by platform utilities

### 1AC --- Solvency

#### The plan effectively targets only the most dominant tech companies and limits their power

Klipa, 19 (Nik Decosta Klipa, 3-13-2019, accessed on 9-2-2021, Boston.com, "4 things to know about how — and if — Elizabeth Warren's plan to break up the tech giants would work", https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2019/03/13/elizabeth-warren-big-tech-plan/)//Babcii

2. How exactly would she break up Big Tech? Going further than the Microsoft settlement, Warren’s plan aims to “restore competition to the tech sector” through two approaches. The first would be through legislation to designate companies that have more than $25 billion in annual global revenue and offer “an online marketplace, an exchange, or a platform for connecting third parties” as “platform utilities.” These companies would be prohibited from both running a marketplace and acting as a participant in it. They would also be required to meet “a standard of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory dealing with users.” “If you run a platform where others come to sell, then you don’t get to sell your own items on the platform because you have two comparative advantages,” Warren [told The Verge over the weekend](https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/9/18257965/elizabeth-warren-break-up-apple-monopoly-antitrust). “One, you’ve sucked up information about every buyer and every seller before you’ve made a decision about what you’re going to sell. And second, you have the capacity — because you run the platform — to prefer your product over anyone else’s product. It gives an enormous comparative advantage to the platform.” In her Medium post, Warren said that Amazon Marketplace, Google’s ad exchange, and Google Search would be platform utilities under her proposed law. That means Google Search would have to be spun off from its sprawling parent company, Alphabet. Google-owned ad providers would also have to be split off in order to participate on the company’s ad exchange. Amazon Basics, which sells generic brand electronics and home accessories on Amazon’s website, would have to be broken off into its own company. And in her interview with The Verge, Warren confirmed that Apple would have to be broken up in order to keep offering apps on its App Store. “Apple, you’ve got to break it apart from their App Store,” she said. “It’s got to be one or the other. Either they run the platform or they play in the store. They don’t get to do both at the same time.” Warren’s team says the $25 billion threshold provides a clear line that only captures the most powerful companies. And while there’s a huge list of companies with revenue over that threshold, **very few** of them offer online marketplaces — which are [**different than an online store**](https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-an-online-marketplace-and-an-online-platform) — in which they also compete. Retail giants, like Walmart, or groceries store chains, would still be able to sell their own branded products alongside other brands on their online stores, since they process and fulfill the orders themselves (as opposed to letting third-parties list and sell their products on the website).

#### Legislative action is key

Morton, 20 (Fiona Morton, e Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics at the Yale University School of Management. , 2-18-2020, accessed on 8-31-2021, Equitable Growth, "Reforming U.S. antitrust enforcement and competition policy - Equitable Growth", https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/)//Babcii

Reform antitrust statutes to deter and prevent anticompetitive conduct more effectively Increasing resources and more aggressive enforcement alone will not solve the problem. Judicial decisions interpreting the antitrust laws have significantly (limited) crippled antitrust enforcement. These decisions reflect, at best, an archaic economic understanding of competition or, at worst, simply bad economic reasoning. Under a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions over the past decade, for example, it is doubtful that the government could have successfully broken up AT&T’s phone monopoly in the 1980s. That break up, arguably the government’s most successful monopolization prosecution, focused on AT&T’s refusal to allow MCI, a long-distance competitor, to connect its long-distance service to local phone monopolies. In Verizon Communications v. Trinko, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded a monopolists’ ability to avoid antitrust liability when it refuses to deal with competitor or potential competitor, and also implied that antitrust concerns are subordinate in an industry [subjected to the regulation](https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1160&context=mlr).[22](https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/#footnote-22) More recently, the Supreme Court misapplied basic economic reasoning in a case that, under some interpretations, has the potential to almost **exempt technology platforms from antitrust** enforcement: [Ohio v. American Express](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf).[23](https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/#footnote-23) Since technology platforms comprise an ever-increasing share of economic activity, this situation is of [grave concern](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/feature/multisided-platforms-and-antitrust-enforcement).[24](https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/#footnote-24) Even where the antitrust plaintiffs have been successful, the difficulty and cost of those successes suggest systematic underweighting of the benefits of competition and deference to the desire of the corporation for increased market power. The government’s long battles over stopping pay-for-delay deals and anticompetitive hospital mergers are notable examples of this misalignment, as is the approval by the government of the Sprint-T-mobile merger. In all of these cases, the corporations did not seek that market power on the merits, but through regulation (Trinko or state-supervised hospital mergers), exclusion (pay for delay and American Express), or merger (AT&T-TimeWarner or Sprint-T-mobile). Despite the government’s success in some merger litigation, this success only occurs in transactions that [most clearly violate the law](https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0231/otto-bock-healthcarefreedom-innovations).[25](https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/#footnote-25) The fact that the two antitrust agencies must litigate cases that are clearly anticompetitive—rather than the parties not even considering the deal in the first place or abandoning it after the government makes its concerns known—speaks to the limitations of current antitrust legal doctrine. **It would likely take decades to reverse this body of accumulated legal doctrine, even if every future case that was litigated were decided with perfect accuracy**. Fortunately, **Congress is the final arbiter on competition law** and can change it to reflect the desire of society for competitive markets. Congress has not substantively amended those laws in more than 60 years. A broad foundation of economic research supports retooling our antitrust laws for the 21st century and restoring the vigor that was originally intended. Although legislation can take many forms, successful antitrust reform **legislation should** accomplish four goals: **Overturn Supreme Court preceden**t that has inoculated exclusionary conduct from antitrust scrutiny even when it harms competition by eliminating or harming competitors **Prohibit courts from assuming that some aspect of a market is competitive** or will become competitive rather than assessing the evidence in the case Create simple rules (known as presumptions) that will **lower the resource cost of enforcement** for conduct and acquisitions that economic research shows are likely to raise competitive problems Clarify that the antitrust laws are designed to **protect competition** that may manifest itself across a broad range of outcomes such as higher prices, reduced quality, harm to innovation, lower input prices, and elimination of potential competition

# 2AC

## Adv---Resiliency

### 2AC --- AI --- F/L

#### AND Europe is a larger IL

Schuman 2-16-2021, MA, international affairs, correspondent for TIME. (Michael, "Europe can’t stay neutral in US-China stand-off", *POLITICO*, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-cant-stay-neutral-in-us-china-stand-off/)

China also represents a long-term economic threat to Europe — not merely because it is an advancing competitor in a global market economy, but because Beijing’s policies are designed to use and abuse that open world economy to eventually dominate it. Beijing’s leadership makes no secret of its goal to foster high-tech industries and national champions to overtake its established Western rivals, fueled by untold billions of state aid. By one estimate, the Chinese government has lavished more than $100 billion on its electric vehicle sector, in the form of subsidies for buyers, research and development support and other aid. Another $49 billion has been committed to create a Chinese competitor to Airbus. Partnerships with European companies are vital to the success of China’s agenda. Beijing sees joint ventures and other corporate cooperation with foreign companies as a way to extract the advanced technology and know-how required for China to catch up to, and then leapfrog over, the Western world. An October report from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies argues that the Chinese are targeting key sectors of the German economy — including industrial equipment and electronics — with the aim of pillaging them. China’s economic relations with Germany are “a template for the CCP strategy to dominate the 21st-century economy and set the rules for the modern world,” the report contends. In other words, by continuing to engage with China, Germany is gaining today, but paving the way to its doom tomorrow. There’s little chance European politicians can talk China into a better relationship. After seven years of negotiations, the EU’s recent investment agreement with China “amounts to so little,” lamented Brussels-based think tank Bruegel in a January analysis. Littered with vague pledges and lacking methods of enforcement, Bruegel noted that even on market access, the agreement’s primary focus, “only a few concessions have been made bilaterally and all of them are limited.” Simply hoping the Chinese will play fair is naïve. While Beijing threatens and blusters that Europeans must keep their markets open to 5G gear from Huawei, the Chinese are sidelining European telecom firms in the China market. Ultimately, China is simply not a true partner for Europe. The longer Europeans fail to grasp this, the weaker their position will become. China will continue to exploit the divisions between democracies to advance its interests. European politicians will strain relations with the U.S. by cynically reaping economic benefits from China while Washington does all the fighting. By the time Europe realizes it needs America’s help, it could discover Washington has found other, more reliable friends. Ultimately, the choice between the U.S. and China should be determined by what Europeans want their role in the world to be. They could defend the liberal order they helped create and continue to participate in global leadership. Or they could sit back and watch authoritarian China knock away the pillars of the current order, and the sources of European influence with them. Is the choice really that hard?

#### a. Infiltration is historically bunk

\* Japan/AT&T disprove, Consumers won’t switch, Chinese history of failure, and trade solves

Perriello, 19 (Tom Perriello, formerly represented Virginia’s 5th District in the U.S. House, is executive director of Open Society-U.S. at the Open Society Foundations., 6-17-2019, accessed on 8-19-2021, The Hill, "Don't worry about China when breaking up Facebook", <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/448834-dont-worry-about-china-when-breaking-up-facebook)//Babcii>

Both of these arguments are red herrings, cynically setting up alternative futures, designed to create a culture of fear and intimidate people into defending the status quo power of Big Tech. We heard similar arguments decades ago from executives at [IBM and AT&T](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/opinion/facebook-china-tech-competition.html) facing antitrust scrutiny in the 1980s. In that case, the competition was Japan and its state-supported computer monopoly that threatened to take over U.S. challengers. Federal regulators didn’t buy the arguments then, and they moved to break up IBM and later Microsoft. Neither suit ended in a full break-up, but the litigation caused both companies to open their platforms to encourage more competition.) In the end, Japan’s monopolistic market fell behind, and the United States, with its culture of competition, raced ahead. There is little reason to believe American consumers will race to use a Chinese-based social network. No Chinese Internet company has ever made any meaningful entrance into the American consumer market, even in earlier periods when competition was more robust. Even if they did, it would encourage the American companies to compete in turn and improve their own service offerings. “This is a classic straw man argument,” says Facebook co-founder Chris Hughes. “Breaking up Facebook would not hamstring its ability to compete, or allow China to walk all over us. In fact, a more level playing field would drive new and innovative investment. A post-breakup Facebook would still be massively profitable, with plenty of resources to make such investments. And the federal government could respond to any Chinese intervention using the same tools of trade, tariffs and incentives it has used on other fronts.”

#### b. Breakups don’t induce resource restrictions

Perriello, 19 (Tom Perriello, formerly represented Virginia’s 5th District in the U.S. House, is executive director of Open Society-U.S. at the Open Society Foundations., 6-17-2019, accessed on 8-19-2021, The Hill, "Don't worry about China when breaking up Facebook", <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/448834-dont-worry-about-china-when-breaking-up-facebook)//Babcii>

“This is a classic straw man argument,” says Facebook co-founder Chris Hughes. “Breaking up Facebook would not hamstring its ability to compete, or allow China to walk all over us. In fact, a more level playing field would drive new and innovative investment. A post-breakup Facebook would still be massively profitable, with plenty of resources to make such investments. And the federal government could respond to any Chinese intervention using the same tools of trade, tariffs and incentives it has used on other fronts.” Similarly, while it is true that artificial intelligence relies on vast amounts of data and computing power, Big Tech firms that have been broken up would still have plenty of both. In Facebook’s case, hundreds of millions of Americans use Facebook’s core product, Facebook.com, and even in a break-up scenario, it would be worth hundreds of billions of dollars. (Indeed, many see this as a weakness in the break-up arguments.) Facebook’s revenues alone would still be in the tens of billions of dollars, making it one of the largest companies in the world and giving it more than enough resources to power AI research. From a civil society perspective, it’s concerning that even a post-breakup Facebook would still be a dominant force in the research and development of AI. But the argument that breaking up the company would dramatically impair its impact on AI doesn’t hold water.

#### c. 742 markets disprove exit valve theory

Koski et al., 20 (Heli Koski, Otto Kässi, and Fabian Braesemann, Koski is a Research Director at Etla Economic Research and a Research Director at Aalto University, Kässi is a Researcher at Etla EconomicResearch., Braesemann is a Research fellow andData Scientist at Oxford University’s Saïd Business School., 1-7-2020, accessed on 8-20-2021, Etla , "Killers on the Road of Emerging Start-ups – Implications for Market Entry and Venture Capital Financing", https://www.etla.fi/en/publications/killers-on-the-road-of-emerging-start-ups-implications-for-market-entry-and-venture-capital-financing/)//Babcii

5. Conclusions We studied the effects of acquisitions made by the large US-based technology companies on the entry dynamics and venture capital financing in different product markets. We used **data from 742 product markets globally**, distinguishing the US and European markets for the years 2003-2018. Our estimation results suggest that the technology giants' buyouts subsequently reduced market entry rates and decreased available venture capital funding in the target product markets of tech giants' acquisitions. In other words, the acquisitions of data giants seem to generate the so-called kill zone effect. Our empirical analysis further suggests that the kill zone effect was strengthened during the 2010s when large technology companies gained increasing access to user data. Furthermore, we find that technology giants' acquisitions of platform companies have decreased market entry in non-platform markets.

#### 4. Consolidation starves the field of brain power that’s k2 military primacy

**Brustein, 20** (Joshua Brustein, Tech editor for Bloomberg, BA from NYU, 3-16-2020, accessed on 8-19-2021, Bloomberg, "Big Tech Swallows Most of the Hot AI Startups", https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-16/big-tech-swallows-most-of-the-hot-ai-startups#:~:text=An%20acquisition%20spree%20by%20Apple,power%20in%20this%20critical%20field.&text=Yoshua%20Bengio%2C%20scientific%20director%20of,Yann%20LeCun%20of%20Facebook%20Inc.)//Babcii

It's particularly important to have a broad, diverse community developing AI because the technology is informing more decisions and has been susceptible to bias, [according to researchers](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-04/researchers-combat-gender-and-racial-bias-in-artificial-intelligence). Representatives for Turi and Apple declined to comment, as did Amazon, Facebook, Google and Microsoft. Apart from consolidating promising technology, many of the acquisitions were done to amass talent. There's a shortage of workers with experience in deep learning and machine learning, and many companies, not just in tech, are competing for these specialists. Google's 2013 purchase of DNNResearch brought deep-learning godfather Geoffrey Hinton to the internet giant. In 2014, Google also snapped up DeepMind, a London research outfit led by Demis Hassabis that used software to beat the best players at the strategy game Go and is working on health applications for AI. The industry’s deal spree has raised concern that the biggest technology companies have a lock on brain power in a field that's considered critical to the future of computing, global competitiveness and even military supremacy. "It's the most important technology we will see in our lifetime,” said Diego Oppenheimer, CEO of Seattle-based Algorthimia, which provides a marketplace for machine-learning algorithms. “When you look at it that way, if it is concentrated on the few, it's going to be really hard to compete with those few.” At least some of the motivation behind the acquisition of smaller AI firms has to be more than talent hoarding, according to Frederic Laurin, partnership director at Mila, a prominent Montreal-based deep learning research lab. “The other potential explanation is they see those firms as competitors,” he said.

#### 5. Integration and contractual limitations turn

Sitaraman, 20 (Ganesh Sitaraman , Prof @ Vanderbilt University law school, A.B. in government magna cum laude from Harvard College, a master’s degree in political thought from Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and his J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. longtime advisor to Elizabeth Warren, 1-30-2020, accessed on 7-18-2021, Papers.ssrn, "The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech by Ganesh Sitaraman :: SSRN", https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3537870)//Babcii

The claim that breaking up and regulating big tech might have consequences for great power competition deserves to be taken seriously. The problem is that upon serious consideration, the national security case against breaking up and regulating big tech is not just weak—it is backwards. Far from being a threat to the United States, breaking up and regulating big tech are necessary to preserve America’s competitiveness, national defense, and democratic freedoms in an era of great power competition.

First, big tech companies are not competing with China in some kind of new Cold War arms race; rather, many are integrated with China, seeking to expand further into China, and cooperating with Chinese companies and (by extension) likely with the Chinese government. Big tech’s integration with China thus supports the rise and export of digital authoritarianism; deepens economic dependence that can be used as leverage against the United States in future geopolitical moments; forces companies to self-censor and contort their preferences to serve Chinese censors and officials; and makes profit-seeking corporations and their lobbyists less trustworthy in advocating for the interests of the United States in Washington, D.C. Second, in an era of great power competition, innovation and a strong defense industrial base are essential. But relying on a small number of big tech companies (and, in particular, failing to enforce antitrust laws and regulate the sector) means less competition— and that in turn means less innovation, particularly when compared with a system of robust competition and public investment in research and development. Concentration in the tech sector also weakens the **d**efense **i**ndustrial **b**ase by making the government dependent on a **small number of contractors** and redirecting taxpayer dollars from research to monopoly profits. Taking into account all of these dynamics, national security arguments do not favor protecting big tech companies from competition and regulation. American national security would be strengthened by breaking up and regulating big tech companies.

#### 6. No China war AND it doesn’t go nuclear

Shifrinson 2/8/19 [Joshua Shifrinson is an assistant professor of international relations at Boston University. The ‘new Cold War’ with China is way overblown. Here’s why. February 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/08/there-isnt-a-new-cold-war-with-china-for-these-4-reasons/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.f8ca8195c4e4]

Is a new Cold War looming — or already present — between the United States and China? Many analysts argue that a combination of geopolitics, ideology and competing visions of “global order” are driving the two countries toward emulating the Soviet-U.S. rivalry that dominated world politics from 1947 through 1990. But such concerns are overblown. Here are four big reasons why. 1. The historical backdrops of the two relationships are very different When the Cold War began, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was fragile and tenuous. Bilateral diplomatic relations were barely a decade old, U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution was a recent memory, and the Soviet Union had called for the overthrow of capitalist governments into the 1940s. Despite their Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, the two countries shared few meaningful diplomatic, economic or institutional links. In 2019, the situation between the United States and China is very different. Since the 1970s, diplomatic interactions, institutional ties and economic flows have all exploded. Although each side has criticized the other for domestic interference (such as U.S. demands for journalist access to Tibet and China’s espionage against U.S. corporations), these issues did not prevent cooperation on a host of other issues. Yes, there were tensions over the past decade, but these occurred against a generally cooperative backdrop. 2. Geography and powers’ nuclear postures suggest East Asia is more stable than Cold War-era Europe The Cold War was shaped by an intense arms race, nuclear posturing and crises, especially in continental Europe. Given Europe’s political geography, the United States feared a “bolt from the blue” attack would allow the Soviet Union to conquer the continent. Accordingly, the United States prepared to defend Europe with conventional forces, and to deter Soviet aggrandizement using nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also feared that the United States might attack and wanted to deter U.S. adventurism. Concerns that the other superpower might use force and that crises could quickly escalate colored Cold War politics. Today, the United States and China spend proportionally far less on their militaries than the United States and the Soviet Union did. Though an arms race may be emerging, U.S. and Chinese nuclear postures are not nearly as large or threatening: Arsenals remain far below the size and scope witnessed in the Cold War, and are kept at a lower state of alert. As for geography, East Asia is not primed for tensions akin to those in Cold War Europe. China can threaten to coerce its neighbors, but the water barriers separating China from most of Asia’s strategically important states make outright conquest significantly harder. Of course, as scholars such as Caitlin Talmadge and Avery Goldstein note, crises may still erupt, and each side may face pressures to escalate. Unlike the Cold War, however, U.S.-Chinese confrontations occur at sea with relatively limited forces and without clear territorial boundaries. This suggests there are countervailing factors that may give the two sides room to negotiate — and limit the speed with which a crisis unfolds.

## Adv---Russia

## Adv---Europe

## OFF

### 2AC --- K --- (s)

#### 7. No impact

\*biod, nitrogen, phosphorous, ag, chemicals, pollution, waste, and govs check black swans

Peter **Kareiva 18**, Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University of California, Los Angeles. 01/2018, “Existential Risk Due to Ecosystem Collapse: Nature Strikes Back.” Futures, CrossRef, doi:10.1016/j.futures.2018.01.001.

The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not clear. One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than .001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). There is little evidence that this particular .001% annual loss is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would allow one to identify where the threshold was (Brook et al., 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). A better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute number of extinctions that would be required to create this dystopia. While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species number declines locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al 2017; Vellend et al., 2013). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk. What about the remaining eight planetary boundaries? Stratospheric ozone depletion is one—but thanks to the Montreal Protocol ozone depletion is being reversed (Hand, 2016). Disruptions of the nitrogen cycle and of the phosphorous cycle have also been proposed as representing potential planetary boundaries (one boundary for nitrogen and one boundary for phosphorous). There are compelling data linking excesses in these nutrients to environmental damage. For example, over-application of fertilizer in Midwestern USA has led to dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico. Similarly, excessive nitrogen has polluted groundwater in California to such an extent that it is unsuitable for drinking and some rural communities are forced to drink bottled water. However, these impacts are local. At the same time that there is too much N loading in the US, there is a need for more N in Africa as a way of increasing agricultural yields (Mueller et al., 2012). While the disruption of nitrogen and phosphorous cycles clearly perturb local ecosystems, end-of-the-world scenarios seem a bit far-fetched. Another hypothesized planetary boundary entails the conversion of natural habitats to agricultural land. The mechanism by which too much agricultural land could cause a crisis is unclear—unless it is because land conversion causes so much biodiversity loss that is species extinctions that are the proximate cause of an eco-catastrophe. Excessive chemical pollution and excessive atmospheric aerosol loading have each been suggested as planetary boundaries as well. In the case of these pollution boundaries, there are well-documented mechanisms by which surpassing some concentration of a pollutant inflicts severe human health hazards. There is abundant evidence linking chemical and aerosol pollution to higher mortality and lower reproductive success in humans, which in turn could cause a major die-off. It is perhaps appropriate then that when Hollywood envisions an unlivable world, it often invokes a story of humans poisoning themselves. That said, it is doubtful that we will poison ourselves towards extinction. Data show that as nations develop and increase their wealth, they tend to clean up their air and water and reduce environmental pollution (Flörke et al., 2013; Hao & Wang, 2005). In addition, as economies become more circular (see Mathews & Tan, 2016), environmental damage due to waste products is likely to decline. The key point is that the pollutants associated with the planetary boundaries are so widely recognized, and the consequences of local toxic events are so immediate, that it is reasonable to expect national governments to act before we suffer a planetary ecocatastrophe.

### 2AC --- States ---- F/L

#### 3. Link to net ben

Bulman-Pozen 16 (Jessica, Associate Professor, Columbia Law School, EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM COMES TO AMERICA, 102 Va. L. Rev. 953, June, lexis)

As I have suggested, executive federalism grows out of the political polarization of our times. Hyperpolarized parties gridlock Congress and further empower the executive branch, but they also create strong links across the state-federal divide. n172 These links may enable something like party government through state-federal cooperation among co-partisans, enhancing the ability of the federal executive and certain states to act. At the same time, the state-federal connection amplifies opportunities for partisan resistance and contestation. If state and federal executives seek each other out because of partisan affinity, their collaborations tend also to bring in other state actors with opposing positions.

#### 4. Can’t solve ---They won’t enforce, or they’ll lose, and it takes forever

**Rauch, 20** (Daniel Rauch, J.D. Yale Law School, 3-12-2020, accessed on 8-18-2021, Cleveland state law review, "Sherman Sherman's Missing "Supplement": Sherman’s Missing "Supplement": Prosecutorial Capacity, Agency , Incentives, and the False Dawn of Antitrust Federalism", https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4079&context=clevstlrev)//Babcii

Yet, if the early **failure of antitrust federalism** holds a single lesson, it is that even such compelling political, historical, and economic imperatives are, without more, insufficient to spur **state antitrust action**. Unless **state prosecutors** have the capacity and incentives to take on the antitrust challenge, they **will not act**. What does this mean for today’s state antitrust enforcers? On one hand, the years since 1890 have seen several innovations that substantially mitigate the problem of prosecutorial capacity. Multistate organizations like the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) have allowed for coordination and information sharing between attorneys general on antitrust matters, thus reducing the costs and burden of such cases.206 Likewise, the rise of multistate antitrust suits brought jointly by dozens of states allows for cost-and-capacity-sharing.207 Changes in federal law, like the HartScott-Rodino Act of 1976, created an economic incentive for states to pursue antitrust cases by codifying the ability of state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae and by offering states treble damages when they prevail (a strong economic incentive if ever there was one).208 Going further, the federal government has sometimes expressly subsidized state antitrust efforts, as with the supplemental funding offered in the Crime Control Act of 1976.209 And in some states, the capacity of the attorney general’s office has increased to levels inconceivable at the turn of the century: New York’s Attorney General, for instance, supervises over 1,800 employees,210 while California employs a staggering 4,500.211 Perhaps because of these shifts, it is unsurprising that in recent times at least some state attorneys general have heeded the call to enforce state and federal antitrust laws, from local investigations of healthcare consolidation212 to multistate actions against Silicon Valley behemoths like Apple and Amazon.213 Yet, despite these evolutions, the **constraints of** **prosecutorial capacity remain a key factor** in the vigor, or impotence, of state antitrust enforcement. This is especially salient given that many of the most important antitrust issues unfold in novel industries, demanding an unusual degree of **economic and technological savvy** and involving **powerful** and well-heeled entities like **Amazon, Google**,214 **and Apple**.215 Moreover, the very trend of multistate suits that allows jurisdictions to pool antitrust resources might also allow states to “free ride,” appending their name to litigation that is largely carried out by other states or by the federal Department of Justice.216 In this way, a state attorney general might reap most of the political dividends of being an “antitrust enforcement leader” without committing any substantial resources to combatting unlawful corporate concentrations. Finally, while a small minority of state attorneys general offices have gargantuan staffs and budgets, **many remain small**, resource-starved offices whose **capability to take on “the big case**”217 of a full-bore antitrust prosecution **remains limited**.218

#### b. Only federal engagement with Vestager solves --- That’s Dorpe --- States can’t access that internal link AND make it worse

**Kovacic, 21** (William Kovacic, Writing on behalf of the FTC, William Evan Kovacic is an American lawyer and legal scholar who served as a member of the Federal Trade Commission from 2006 to 2011. Kovacic is currently a professor at George Washington University Law School, 3-4-2021, accessed on 9-13-2021, FTC, "Toward a Domestic Competition", https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public\_statements/toward-domestic-competition-network/040421domesticcomp.pdf)//Babcii

From the perspective of the United States, the existing design of domestic institutions for making competition policy could inhibit progress toward international convergence on competition policy processes and substantive standards. **Decentralization** and multiplicity in U.S. competition policy making complicates the attainment of a nationwide consensus about the appropriate content of procedures and substantive requirements. This is evident where two or more independent institutions exercise overlapping authority in the absence of a hierarchy of authority that makes the decision of one actor binding on another institutions. The DOJ and the FTC may be **seen as lacking the ability to speak authoritatively to foreign governments about U.S**. competition **policy because** their pronouncements do not bind other institutions, such as sectoral regulators and **state attorneys general**, which independently exercise policymaking power over a wide range of business activity. Coordination of competition policy making for individual transactions among foreign competition authorities becomes more costly where the preferences of several domestic agencies, rather than one institution, are relevant to the policy outcome. For example, a foreign competition authority can negotiate common terms with its competition policy counterparts, but it must also await the outcome of proceedings before a sectoral regulator in the same matter. Competition authorities may lack mechanisms for sharing information and views with the sectoral regulators in the same way that they share information and views with their antitrust counterparts.

### 2AC --- Adv --- F/L

#### a. Its insufficient --- They’ve been exempted

Morton, 20 (Fiona Morton, e Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics at the Yale University School of Management. , 2-18-2020, accessed on 8-31-2021, Equitable Growth, "Reforming U.S. antitrust enforcement and competition policy - Equitable Growth", https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/)//Babcii

Reform antitrust statutes to deter and prevent anticompetitive conduct more effectively Increasing resources and more aggressive enforcement alone will not solve the problem. Judicial decisions interpreting the antitrust laws have significantly (limited) crippled antitrust enforcement. These decisions reflect, at best, an archaic economic understanding of competition or, at worst, simply bad economic reasoning. Under a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions over the past decade, for example, it is doubtful that the government could have successfully broken up AT&T’s phone monopoly in the 1980s. That break up, arguably the government’s most successful monopolization prosecution, focused on AT&T’s refusal to allow MCI, a long-distance competitor, to connect its long-distance service to local phone monopolies. In Verizon Communications v. Trinko, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded a monopolists’ ability to avoid antitrust liability when it refuses to deal with competitor or potential competitor, and also implied that antitrust concerns are subordinate in an industry [subjected to the regulation](https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1160&context=mlr).[22](https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/#footnote-22) More recently, the Supreme Court misapplied basic economic reasoning in a case that, under some interpretations, has the potential to almost **exempt technology platforms from antitrust** enforcement: [Ohio v. American Express](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf).[23](https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/#footnote-23) Since technology platforms comprise an ever-increasing share of economic activity, this situation is of [grave concern](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/feature/multisided-platforms-and-antitrust-enforcement).[24](https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/#footnote-24) Even where the antitrust plaintiffs have been successful, the difficulty and cost of those successes suggest systematic underweighting of the benefits of competition and deference to the desire of the corporation for increased market power. The government’s long battles over stopping pay-for-delay deals and anticompetitive hospital mergers are notable examples of this misalignment, as is the approval by the government of the Sprint-T-mobile merger. In all of these cases, the corporations did not seek that market power on the merits, but through regulation (Trinko or state-supervised hospital mergers), exclusion (pay for delay and American Express), or merger (AT&T-TimeWarner or Sprint-T-mobile). Despite the government’s success in some merger litigation, this success only occurs in transactions that [most clearly violate the law](https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0231/otto-bock-healthcarefreedom-innovations).[25](https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/#footnote-25) The fact that the two antitrust agencies must litigate cases that are clearly anticompetitive—rather than the parties not even considering the deal in the first place or abandoning it after the government makes its concerns known—speaks to the limitations of current antitrust legal doctrine. **It would likely take decades to reverse this body of accumulated legal doctrine, even if every future case that was litigated were decided with perfect accuracy**. Fortunately, **Congress is the final arbiter on competition law** and can change it to reflect the desire of society for competitive markets. Congress has not substantively amended those laws in more than 60 years. A broad foundation of economic research supports retooling our antitrust laws for the 21st century and restoring the vigor that was originally intended. Although legislation can take many forms, successful antitrust reform **legislation should** accomplish four goals: **Overturn Supreme Court preceden**t that has inoculated exclusionary conduct from antitrust scrutiny even when it harms competition by eliminating or harming competitors **Prohibit courts from assuming that some aspect of a market is competitive** or will become competitive rather than assessing the evidence in the case Create simple rules (known as presumptions) that will lower the resource cost of enforcement for conduct and acquisitions that economic research shows are likely to raise competitive problems Clarify that the antitrust laws are designed to **protect competition** that may manifest itself across a broad range of outcomes such as higher prices, reduced quality, harm to innovation, lower input prices, and elimination of potential competition

#### b. Only the Plan can send a clear signal

Karabell, 20 – Zachary Karabell is a WIRED contributor and president of River Twice Research. (“What the EU Gets Right—and the US Gets Wrong—About Antitrust,” https://www.wired.com/story/what-eu-gets-right-us-wrong-antitrust/)//Babcii

Over time, US law has come to view antitrust through a single lens: harm to the consumer. That’s a problem for critics of Big Tech, because the companies give away many of their products for free and can argue that in other cases they lower prices. The US antitrust framework simply isn’t well-suited to the unique structure and scope of these 21st-century behemoths. In the words of Lina Khan, an attorney who served on the staff of the House antitrust subcommittee that issued a highly critical report of the tech giants in October, “the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competition to consumer welfare, defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power in the modern economy.” The report says tech’s Big Four have gone from being “scrappy, underdog startups” to the “kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons” and that have acquired too much power that they have then exploited. Khan favors changing the law to look more broadly at the ill effects of monopolies. The blunt approach favored by some antitrust advocates in the US contrasts with the surgical tactics of the EU. Breakups are rhetorically appealing; they cut through the media noise and say, “We are doing something!” For that reason, they’re likely to gather continued bipartisan steam. Moreover, the EU’s focus on who owns what data and how it can be used has done little to slow Big Tech’s ascent.

### 2AC --- Infra --- F/L

#### 1. Both bills are DOA --- Debt, provisions, nominees, and 2nd threat of gov shutdown will be first --- Ensures fights, means the vote is ATLEAST a month away, and the bill will be tiny

U.S Office of Public Policy, 10/1 (a Swiss multinational investment bank and financial services company founded and based in Switzerland. Co-headquartered in the cities of Zürich and Basel, it maintains a presence in all major financial centres as the largest Swiss banking institution and the largest private bank in the world. “Washington Weekly: Debt Ceiling Chicken.” October 1st, 2021. <https://www.ubs.com/us/en/wealth-management/washington-weekly/2021/washington-weekly-01-oct-2021.html>.)NR \*Mill Valley Heg <3\*

This Week: The Senate approved various Biden administration nominations. The House passed a bill to increase the debt ceiling (see below). Both chambers passed a short-term government funding bill to prevent a government shutdown (see below). Next Week: The Senate will have additional votes on the debt ceiling and Biden administration **nominees**. The House will continue to seek to come to a consensus on the bipartisan infrastructure bill and the budget reconciliation bill (see below). The Leads Very Muddled Policy Agenda. This week could have led to the advancement of four very significant policy issues, but it wasn’t to be. Three issues remain at an impasse, while the fourth was tackled on a bipartisan basis. We address these issues below. Debt Ceiling Chicken. Both Republicans and Democrats continued to engage in brinksmanship on the need to raise the debt ceiling to avoid a catastrophic default. While Democrats in the Senate this week removed the debt ceiling from the short-term government funding bill in order to pass that measure, they will continue to bring up the debt ceiling as a standalone measure in an effort to apply pressure on Senate Republicans to approve the extension on a bipartisan basis. To pass the Senate, the debt ceiling would need to hurdle a 60-vote procedural requirement, which requires the assent of at least 10 Republicans. Democrats will continue to pressure Republicans through debt ceiling votes over the next week or two, although they will also need to more seriously consider the back-up plan of passing a debt ceiling increase through budget reconciliation. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen indicated to Congress that it is unclear whether the government would have the funds needed to make debt and other required obligations beginning on October 18, though other analyses have suggested that there is greater room for maneuver. Regardless, with time running out, one side will need to blink soon to get to a resolution. Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill. The Senate-passed bipartisan infrastructure bill was scheduled for a vote yesterday in the House, but House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) had to pull the bill off the schedule late last night because there weren’t enough votes to pass it. Progressives and moderates in the House Democratic caucus disagree on the timing of a vote on this bill. Progressives continue to threaten to withhold their support of the infrastructure bill until the chamber votes on the much larger budget reconciliation bill. While this is likely only a temporary setback for the infrastructure bill, it’s unclear exactly when a vote will be rescheduled. Speaker Pelosi indicated that her goal is to have a vote in the next few days, but its timing more likely will need to coincide with a House vote on the budget reconciliation bill, which we believe is still weeks away. We believe the infrastructure bill will ultimately pass but more intra-party drama will overshadow the issue for the next few weeks. Democrats’ Budget Reconciliation Bill. The House had a very tentative plan to vote this week on a roughly $3.5 trillion social spending plan that also includes major tax increases, but this ambitious plan was quickly scrapped by Democratic leaders. Moderate House Democrats only want to vote on a budget reconciliation plan that is likely to pass in the Senate. Given that a few Senate Democrats remain uneasy about the size, scope and timing of the bill, it remains unclear what legislation can pass the Senate and when this could happen. The budget reconciliation measure remains very much alive, but, given the positions of these Senators, changes will need to be made to the bill to shrink its size and scale. The majority of the tax provisions that have been discussed over the last few weeks remain in play for inclusion in a final version of the bill. Averting a Government Shutdown. Lawmakers in both chambers did make progress in one area by passing a bill to fund government agencies and operations beginning today, the start of the new fiscal year. This action temporarily averted a government shutdown, which would have started today if the bill had not been passed. The bill provides funds for the government until December 3 at levels equal to the prior fiscal year. While this is good news, it **amounts to a punt** – Congress will have to craft a broader bill to fund government for the rest of the fiscal year by the December deadline. The government funding bill to be written in two months will have to be bipartisan, and it likely will be on Congress’ list of challenges at that time. Bottom Line. Attempts at a resolution for the debt ceiling will dominate congressional action over the next two weeks. The debate and rhetoric will be harsh and partisan over that period, but congressional leaders will have to get more serious and figure out a plan forward by mid-October. We believe there will be a solution, but first the politics of the issue will need to play out over the next two weeks. Budget reconciliation will be the top priority once a debt ceiling increase is finalized. In the meantime, Democrats will work behind the scenes to address serious disagreements within the party on the size and scope of the big budget reconciliation bill. They need to be completely united to get this bill over the finish line and are nowhere near that point as of today. The fate of the bipartisan infrastructure bill seems inextricably tied to the budget reconciliation package. The House is unlikely to vote on the former until there is an agreement on the latter. This is our projection today, though these issues are subject to new dynamics every day that could change our thinking.

#### 2. Manchema kills it --- They’re too paid off to care

Jones, 9/29 (Sarah Jones, 9-29-2021, accessed on 10-1-2021, Intelligencer, "The Bottomless Emptiness of **Manchema**", <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/09/the-bottomless-emptiness-of-manchema.html)//babcii>

Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona appear to relish the power they wield over the rest of the party. They are, in effect, holding the president’s priorities hostage to their personal whims. That’s not a new story in politics. But their stubbornness in the face of contemporary challenges reveals the **bottomless emptiness** of their brand of centrist politics. Manchin and Sinema say they are worried about the money, so much so that Manchin has [called](https://apnews.com/article/business-933207cd2af1b1d0969be55aaf3b778a) for a “strategic pause” on the bill. “I, for one, won’t support a $3.5 trillion bill, or anywhere near that level of additional spending, without greater clarity about why Congress chooses to ignore the serious effects inflation and debt have on existing government programs,” he [wrote](https://www.wsj.com/articles/manchin-pelosi-biden-3-5-trillion-reconciliation-government-spending-debt-deficit-inflation-11630605657) in an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal. As countless wonks have pointed out, however, the bill is [largely paid for](https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/21/economy/inflation-biden-infrastructure/index.html) and should have minimal effect on inflation and the national debt. Though it has been [reported](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/24/us/politics/carbon-tax-democrats.html) that she is against the tax hikes in the bill, Sinema, as is her wont, **appears reluctant to explain her motivations** to the public. In ongoing one-on-one negotiations with Biden himself, she has reportedly **refused to name a price tag** that is acceptable to her. If there is any genuine policy thinking at all behind her recalcitrance, it has yet to emerge. [News](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/us/politics/sinema-fund-raiser-social-climate-bill.html) that she is about to raise money from business interests that oppose the budget **bill** has invited speculation that she is doing her donors’ bidding. Meanwhile, the budget’s climate provisions disturb Manchin, who makes a [**sizable profit**](https://theintercept.com/2021/09/03/joe-manchin-coal-fossil-fuels-pollution/) **from the coal industry**. Perhaps plain old **corruption is at work** here. But there is more to it than that. Everyone involved in this saga, from President Biden down, is making a moral choice. The president’s budget is, like all presidential budgets, a public expression of the administration’s values. Sinema and Manchin have also expressed their values in public, even though these are cloaked in boilerplate rhetoric about inflation and taxes. Sinema’s donors are a reflection of her personal priorities. The same is true for Manchin when it comes to the profit motive. **They’ve chosen their benefactors, not their voters**, as their real constituency. The Build Back Better plan is broadly popular with the American public, Data for Progress [reports](https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2021/9/17/the-build-back-better-plan-remains-popular). Certain provisions, like the budget’s investment in home care, are even [more popular](https://www.seiu.org/2021/09/new-poll-81-of-u-s-voters-support-transformative-build-back-better-home-care-investment) than the overall plan, evidence that voters want something more robust than a highway bill. The popularity of the president’s agenda strikes down a key claim put forward, often by moderate Democrats and their defenders: that they’re limited by what their red-state voters want. It’s obvious that **Manchin and Sinema are doing what they want to do**, not what their voters want. Nor are they motivated by what their voters need — a slightly different question that is nevertheless highly relevant to the fate of the Biden budget. The planet is warming, whether Joe Manchin wants to admit it or not. The rampant inequality exposed by COVID can only be solved through greater public spending. If the Democratic Party wants to guarantee a livable future for the public, it is going to have to act while it can. Through their intransigence, these two moderates haven’t just jeopardized what might be Biden’s signature policy achievement. They’ve done more than undermine their party’s electoral future (why should voters support a party that wasted the power they gave it?). They are sacrificing the future itself. And for what? Manchin is genuinely vulnerable to a challenge from the right in a deep-red state, but Sinema is not. In fact, she has practically guaranteed herself a primary challenge that she’s poorly positioned to win. The **Sinema and Manchin** school of politics **defies reality, and common sense** along with it. It has never been more apparent that the real threat to the president is not the left — which has emerged as the strongest defender of the Biden agenda — but the centrists. **They have no vision**. Asked, repeatedly, by the president, their colleagues, and nearly everyone else what it would take for them to support the spending package in question, they have [little to say](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/28/manchin-sinema-dems-biden-514574). That’s a telling silence. Some version of the bill may well pass, but these tortured negotiations have exposed the barrenness of their position. Sinema and Manchin have a way of doing politics that redounds to no one else’s benefit, and sometimes not even themselves. They are risking Biden’s legacy, the prospects of their party, and the well-being of the American public for reasons they can’t even articulate. **If only they were capable of shame.**

#### 3. Plans a massive dub --- builds PC, Bipartisanship AND solidifies dem unity

Lynn, 21 (Barry Lynn , executive director of the Open Markets Institute, 1-11-2021, accessed on 8-27-2021, Washington Monthly, "How Biden Can Transform America | Washington Monthly", https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january-february-march-2021/how-biden-can-transform-america/)//Babcii

The first thing Biden would get from fully embracing anti-monopolism is an easy-to-tell story of what went wrong in America, why it went wrong, how we can fix it, and where we are going as a nation. Biden would also gain the ability to demonstrate that he understands the anger and hopelessness that so many Americans feel about the loss of their prosperity and independence and about the destruction of their families and communities. Learning how to tell this story will prove surprisingly easy. The beauty of traditional American anti-monopolism is precisely that the language is not technical, and enforcement does not depend on phalanxes of specially trained economists or any of the other “experts” long ago pressed into the service of oligarchy. It is a language Biden himself already fully understands. After all, anti-monopoly is about giving everyone “a fair shot” and ensuring that everyone is treated with “dignity” and “respect.” It is about fighting cheats and crooks and evildoers. Consider Biden’s speech on the Saturday when CNN finally called the race. “I’ve always believed we can define America in one word: possibilities. That in America everyone should be given an opportunity to go as far as their dreams and God-given ability will take them.” That is the essence of the original idea of America, the America the neoliberals broke when they unleashed the monopolists. The Biden team will also find anti-monopoly policy to be a strategic weapon of great potency. Fully embrace anti-monopolism, and Biden will find himself able to unify the two wings of the Democratic Party. After all, anti-monopolism will allow him to begin to break down many of the economic and political structures that underlie inequality, the hydrocarbon economy, and even racism, while simultaneously creating opportunities for entrepreneurs and investors to build new businesses and create more and better jobs. Fully embrace anti-monopolism, and Biden can also begin to break the GOP’s choke hold on the Senate and the Electoral College. Strong anti-monopoly policy will, after all, empower Biden to deliver millions of rural Americans from the isolation and humiliation that drove so many of them to Trump in the first place. It will do so by breaking the grip of the agricultural, retail, and transportation monopolists who for 40 years have appropriated these people’s lands, looted their communities, and destroyed their families. Fully embrace anti-monopolism, and Biden might even be able to begin to unify much of the American people as a whole against the common threat posed to our national and personal security by the monopolists and their allies in China.

#### 4. No PC or focus tradeoff --- Antitrust is under the radar

**Cadelago and McGraw**, 7-19-**21** (Christopher and Meredith, “‘It’s ceding a lot of terrain to us’: Biden goes populist with little pushback,” accessed 8-5-21, <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/19/biden-populist-antimonopoly-500100>)

When President Joe Biden unveiled a series of sweeping executive orders to combat monopoly power, the response from Republicans was notable — because there was barely one at all.Not long ago, a Democratic administration taking unilateral action to rein in corporations on everything from non-compete agreements to prescription drug affordability would have engendered fury from elected conservatives. Yet over the last week, few Republicans were warning that Biden’s actions would severely (hurt) ~~kneecap~~ business or slow the economic recovery. And inside the White House, the relative silence was not just noticed but seen as vindication. “If you're against competition, then what are you for?” said Bharat Ramamurti, deputy director of the National Economic Council. “Big business charging people whatever they want. You’re for businesses being able to offer workers low wages because there's no other competitor in town to offer something better. I mean, it's very hard to be against competition.” The right’s (silent) ~~muted~~ response to Biden’s orders underscores the remarkable ideological shift that’s occurring in Washington, D.C. A Republican Party once closely allied with corporate America finds itself increasingly less so in the Donald Trump era. Indeed, in the aftermath of Biden’s orders, even officials in Trump’s orbit were saying the politics were smart. “Both [Biden and Trump] have elements in their constituencies that want this, and, by the way, they’re on solid ground with the rest of America,” said a Trump adviser. “America has a love-hate relationship with these companies.”

#### 5. Bills are compartmentalized

Edwards ‘2k (George; March 2000; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, Director of the Center for Presidential Studies; Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol 30. No 1. “Building Coalitions,” p. 6;)

Besides not considering the full range of available views, members of Congress are not generally in a position to make trade-offs between policies. Because of its decentralization, Congress usually considers policies serially, that is, without reference to other policies. Without an integrating mechanism, members have few means by which to set and enforce priorities and to emphasize the policies with which the president is most concerned. This latter point is especially true when the opposition party controls Congress.

#### The bill doesn’t solve warming

Mann 21 (Michael E. Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric Science and Director of the Earth System Science Center at Penn State University, “The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal Is a Return to the Old Way of Politics. That’s A Problem for the Climate”, 8/6/21, https://time.com/6087933/biden-infrastructure-bill-climate-change/)

The looming bipartisan infrastructure deal, if it passes, will be celebrated as a return to pre-Trump politics where politicians reach across the partisan divide, compromise where necessary, and work toward the wrong shared goals. But it’s business as usual when it comes to the defining challenge of our time: the climate crisis. The bill provides nothing tangible to expedite the country’s urgent need to transition towards renewable energy. This deal is a far cry from meeting the moment we find ourselves in. It does not address our dependence on fossil fuels, and instead further enables it. Instead, it is focusing money and resources on technologies that don’t work while ignoring the clear winners—solar, wind, etc.—we have in front of us. In the bill’s current incarnation, I am left wondering what happened to President Joe Biden’s pledge to transform our heavily fossil-fuel-dependent economy into a clean-energy economy. In his campaign he promised to end climate-damaging carbon emissions from U.S. power plants by 2035. But this bill wastes billions of dollars on dubious carbon capture and the fossil fuel industry’s attempt to use hydrogen as a cover to build new gas plants—both of which will do nothing more than strengthen the industry’s hold. This bipartisan deal disguises handouts to polluters as ostensible “climate solutions,” when they in fact fuel additional carbon emissions and, with them, ever-more searing heat waves, drenching floods, parching droughts, infernal wildfires, and devastating superstorms. Further, while Biden pledged to address issues of environmental justice by directing 40% of the administration’s climate and clean-energy investments toward low-income and frontline communities that have most suffered the environmental and health risks from fossil-fuel dependence, this bill weakens critical environmental review processes, placing many of these communities at even greater risk. For example, one section of the bill exempts oil and gas pipelines on federal land from being subject to environmental assessments. Donald Trump was rightly ridiculed for suggesting the solution to California’s climate-change-fueled wildfires was to cut down the trees (and adopt better raking technique). But the bipartisan infrastructure bill includes the same sort of policy Trump supported, calling the logging of 30 million acres of federal forests and $1.6 billion in new taxpayer-funded subsidies to the logging industry “wildfire risk reduction,” waiving environmental protections for logging projects in the name of “fuel breaks,” and giving hundreds of millions of dollars to the timber industry to log new areas and build new processing and power plants under the guise of “ecosystem restoration.” What passed for wacky theatrics when Trump suggested it, now gets labeled shrewd political calculus in 2021. But it’s not wise; it’s dangerous. We need healthy forests to capture carbon in the only safe way: the natural way. Giving the timber industry the keys to our national forests is like giving fossil-fuel giant ExxonMobil the keys to our climate. And speaking of ExxonMobil, senators who belong to the infamous Exxon 11 made up a third of the bill’s co-authors.

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction

Sebastian **Farquhar 17** leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

### 2AC --- Econ --- F/L

#### 2. Growth’s slowing AND future COVID shocks thump biz con

Howard Schneider 21, Reporter for Federal Reserve with Thomson Reuters, and Trevor Hunnicutt, Investment Reporter at Staff Writer at Reuters, “U.S. Economy's Hot Vax Summer Ends in Cool COVID Fall as Delta Rises”, Reuters, 9/3/2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/us-economys-hot-vax-summer-ends-cool-covid-fall-delta-rises-2021-09-03/

The promise of a "normal" U.S. economy this summer, which kicked off with the June revival of restaurants, air travel and baseball games, is transforming into an uncertain fall of rising health and economic risks.

Labor Day weekend, the traditional end of the U.S. summer season, was pegged as the moment when the economy would finally transition out of the pandemic slump, with private sector jobs and wages replacing unemployment benefits.

Instead, the summer is closing with rising COVID-19 case counts, hospitals bulging with patients, a sharp slowdown in jobs and dark predictions. Most startling - the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation projects that between now and Dec. 1 there will be 100,000 COVID deaths, more than in the same period last year, when a wave of winter infections took hold and vaccines were not yet available.

"I don't think fall 2021 is going to give us the catharsis we were waiting for," said Nick Bunker, economic research director for hiring site Indeed, or provide a clear view of how fast U.S. job markets can recover the 5.3 million jobs missing from before the pandemic. "The transition is going to be longer than expected. The issue is, is it a stumble or does the baton get dropped?"

Nonfarm payrolls increased by 235,000 jobs last month after surging 1.053 million in July, the Labor Department said Friday. Economists had expected 728,000 new jobs. read more

Special $300-per-week unemployment benefits end on Saturday. While employers hope that will usher new job applicants into a labor-starved market, there are signs the pandemic may have begun to curb their hiring plans instead. read more

The reopening of schools, far from smoothing the way for parents to return to full-time jobs, has been marked by erratic outbreaks, quarantines and closures, as school boards battle over masking students.

The manager at The Irish Whisper, a pub near the Gaylord National Resort and Convention Center in Oxon Hill, Maryland, said that business has fallen off since an initial summertime rush.

"It's not as great as pre-COVID, but it's better than not having anything," said the manager, who only gave his first name Andrew. "I thought we were in the clear and then this variant emerged."

After a strong start early this summer, attendance is dropping in baseball stadiums.

BIDEN'S VIRUS OVERSHADOWED

It is a particularly sensitive moment for U.S. President Joe Biden.

The Democratic president has taken a hit in the polls from the resurgent virus, faces criticism over the Afghanistan withdrawal and must deal with the aftermath of Hurricane Ida and a gauntlet of deadlines in Congress in coming weeks to keep the government funded and his economic agenda on track.

"There's a lot more work to do," to fix the U.S economy, Biden said Friday, addressing the weak jobs numbers. ""We need to make more progress in fighting the Delta variant," he said, repeating that it was a pandemic of the unvaccinated.

Biden's strategy of wiping out COVID by getting all of the United States vaccinated was hindered by a politically charged anti-vaccination movement this summer, and the pace of vaccinations has slowed since peaking in April.

A run of higher-than-expected inflation due to supply chain woes and labor shortages consumed what would otherwise have been healthy wage gains. A closely watched index of consumer confidence, which can influence spending, tumbled in August to a six-month low.

Progress on the virus "is (Biden's) No. 1 advantage, but people are discouraged and frustrated and it's also interacting with the economy," said one Biden adviser not authorized to speak on the record.

Administration officials believe the recovery largely remains on track, and infrastructure and spending plans may partly make up for the lapsed weekly unemployment insurance payments.

Democrats are hoping to finalize a $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill as soon as this month while also working on a $3.5 trillion bill that could only secure party-line support.

"This bill is going to end years of gridlock," Biden said of the smaller infrastructure bill. "Both literally and figuratively it's going to change things," he said.

Republicans are fighting the administration's most ambitious spending plans. Goldman Sachs economists now estimate the "fiscal cliff," as spending rotates away from the record government transfers of the past 18 months, will be a noticeable drag on growth by late 2022.

Oxford Economics economists expect to trim their outlook for 2021 gross domestic product growth to 5.5%, down from 7% in early August.

The reduction reflects "the deteriorating health situation weighing on optimism and spending, lingering capital and labor supply constraints and a slower inventory rebuild," Oxford chief U.S. economist Gregory Daco said in an email.

DELTA WEIGHS ON HIRING

The August jobs data released Friday showed the current surge of infections, which drove the number of new cases from around 11,000 a day in mid-June to almost 150,000 daily this week, slowed hiring and the broader recovery.

"Today’s report has the Delta variant written all over it," Indeed's Bunker said. "It is clear that the recent surge in COVID-19 cases is a strong headwind to the labor market."

Economists are not expecting the sort of collapse in demand for restaurants, travel and other services seen in earlier virus waves. Many Federal Reserve officials feel businesses and families have learned to navigate the situation, either finding ways to lower the risk of infection as they resume work and business, or worrying less about infection because they're vaccinated.

The disappointing 235,000 in new jobs comes as the unemployment rate fell to 5.2% from 5.4% in July. It has, however, been understated by people misclassifying themselves as being "employed but absent from work."

Some employers argue that job growth figures could be much higher, given the record number of openings, if they had not had to compete with unemployment benefits. That hasn't been borne out in states that ended the federal benefits early over the summer, where there's little evidence more people went back to work.

Instead, employers seem to be pulling back on hiring themselves.

#### a. Section 5 of the FTC act

Ferris et al., 21 (Jamilla Ferris, Lydia Parnes, and Lindsey Edwards, Jamillia has held leadership positions and oversaw mergers at both the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FCC., Co-leader of the privacy and cybersecurity practice, Lydia advises companies on privacy and data protection law compliance and represents them in complex regulatory investigations., Lindsey Edwards is an associate in the Washington, D.C., office of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, where she is a member of the firm's antitrust practice. Her work encompasses a variety of civil and criminal antitrust matters, including litigation, government investigations, and mergers and acquisitions., 7-6-2021, accessed on 8-27-2021, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Professional Corporation Home Page - Palo Alto, Silicon Valley, San Francisco, New York, Seattle, San Diego, Washington, D.C., Shanghai, Hong Kong, Brussels - Spotlight on Antitrust: FTC Open Meeting Reflects Changing Tide, "Spotlight on Antitrust: FTC Open Meeting Reflects Changing Tide", https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/spotlight-on-antitrust-ftc-open-meeting-reflects-changing-tide.html)

Key Takeaways: The decision to depart from the consumer welfare standard (and possibly the rule of reason) leaves Section 5 without a standard; this will encourage a greater level of FTC intervention in business activity and will require time before businesses can ascertain how to comply with the new rules. FTC staff will now have an expedited ability to carry out compulsory process requests, undoubtedly increasing the number and scope of investigations conducted by the FTC. The Democratic Commissioners stressed that the changes adopted will increase transparency and allow the FTC to be more nimble and responsive in its enforcement, and will allow the FTC to fully live up to its statutory mandate and be a more aggressive enforcer. The Republican Commissioners made repeated arguments that the resolutions went beyond the FTC's statutory mandate, citing AMG Capital Management LLC v. FTC as a recent warning against agency overreach, where the Supreme Court unanimously held that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority under Section 13(b) when seeking disgorgement in federal court. The Republican Commissioners also criticized the lack of notice and public comment, as well as the lack of staff involvement in the lead-up to the meeting. All four votes were decided along partisan lines, with the three Democratic Commissioners voting in favor of all the resolutions and the two Republican Commissioners voting against. This partisan division is likely indicative of what is to come under the Biden FTC as long as the current line-up of Commissioners remains. The public comments at the end of the meeting were largely from participants in various industries, including many from the restaurant, healthcare, and farming industries, calling for more aggressive antitrust and consumer protection enforcement against food delivery services, dominant pharmaceutical companies, dominant technology contractors, predatory franchisors, and grocery suppliers. We can expect that all of these areas will receive some attention in the coming years.

#### b. New York “abuse of dominance”

**Abbott, 21** (Alden Abbott, Abbott is a a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, focusing on antitrust issues. He previously served as the Federal Trade Commission’s General Counsel from 2018 to early 2021., 6-13-2021, accessed on 9-13-2021, Truth on the Market, "NY ‘Abuse of Dominance’ Bill Attacks Consumer Welfare and the US Antitrust Tradition", https://truthonthemarket.com/2021/06/13/ny-abuse-of-dominance-bill-attacks-consumer-welfare-and-the-us-antitrust-tradition/)//Babcii

Unfortunately, the New York State Senate seems to have lost sight of the importance of promoting vigorous competition and consumer welfare, not competitor welfare, as the hallmark of American antitrust jurisprudence. The chamber on June 7 passed the ill-named 21st Century Antitrust Act (TCAA), legislation that, if enacted and signed into law, would seriously undermine consumer welfare and innovation. Let’s take a quick look at the TCAA’s parade of horribles. The TCAA makes it unlawful for any person “with a dominant position in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce, in any labor market, or in the furnishing of any service in this state to abuse that dominant position.” A “dominant position” may be established through “direct evidence” that “may include, but is not limited to, the unilateral power to set prices, terms, power to dictate non-price contractual terms without compensation; or other evidence that a person is not constrained by meaningful competitive pressures, such as the ability to degrade quality without suffering reduction in profitability. In labor markets, direct evidence of a dominant position may include, but is not limited to, the use of non-compete clauses or no-poach agreements, or the unilateral power to set wages.” The “direct evidence” language is unbounded and hopelessly vague. What does it mean to not be “constrained by meaningful competitive pressures”? Such an inherently subjective characterization would give prosecutors carte blanche to find dominance. What’s more, since “no court shall require definition of a relevant market” to find liability in the face of “direct evidence,” multiple competitors in a vigorously competitive market might be found “dominant.” Thus, for example, the ability of a firm to use non-compete clauses or no-poach agreements for efficient reasons (such as protecting against competitor free-riding on investments in human capital or competitor theft of trade secrets) would be undermined, even if it were commonly employed in a market featuring several successful and aggressive rivals. “Indirect evidence” based on market share also may establish a dominant position under the TCAA. Dominance would be presumed if a competitor possessed a market “share of forty percent or greater of a relevant market as a seller” or “thirty percent or greater of a relevant market as a buyer”. Those numbers are far below the market ranges needed to find a “monopoly” under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Moreover, given inevitable error associated with both market definitions and share allocations—which, in any event, may fluctuate substantially—potential arbitrariness would attend share based-dominance calculations. Most significantly, of course, market shares may say very little about actual market power. Where entry barriers are low and substitutes wait in the wings, a temporarily large market share may not bestow any ability on a “dominant” firm to exercise power over price or to exclude competitors. In short, it would be trivially easy for non-monopolists possessing very little, if any, market power to be characterized as “dominant” under the TCAA, based on “direct evidence” or “indirect evidence.” Once dominance is established, what constitutes an abuse of dominance? The TCAA states that an “abuse of a dominant position may include, but is not limited to, conduct that tends to foreclose or limit the ability or incentive of one or more actual or potential competitors to compete, such as leveraging a dominant position in one market to limit competition in a separate market, or refusing to deal with another person with the effect of unnecessarily excluding or handicapping actual or potential competitors.” In addition, “[e]vidence of pro-competitive effects shall not be a defense to abuse of dominance and shall not offset or cure competitive harm.” This language is highly problematic. Effective rivalrous competition by its very nature involves behavior by a firm or firms that may “limit the ability or incentive” of rival firms to compete. For example, a company’s introduction of a new cost-reducing manufacturing process, or of a patented product improvement that far surpasses its rivals’ offerings, is the essence of competition on the merits. Nevertheless, it may limit the ability of its rivals to compete, in violation of the TCAA. Moreover, so-called “monopoly leveraging” typically generates substantial efficiencies, and very seldom undermines competition (see here, for example), suggesting that (at best) leveraging theories would generate enormous false positives in prosecution. The TCAA’s explicit direction that procompetitive effects not be considered in abuse of dominance cases further detracts from principled enforcement; it denigrates competition, the very condition that American antitrust law has long sought to promote. Put simply, under the TCAA, “dominant” firms engaging in normal procompetitive conduct could be held liable (and no doubt frequently would be held liable, given their inability to plead procompetitive justifications) for “abuses of dominance.” To top it off, firms convicted of abusing a dominant position would be liable for treble damages. As such, the TCAA would strongly disincentivize aggressive competitive behavior that raises consumer welfare. The TCAA’s negative ramifications would be far-reaching. By embracing a civil law “abuse of dominance” paradigm, the TCAA would run counter to a longstanding U.S. common law antitrust tradition that largely gives free rein to efficiency-seeking competition on the merits. It would thereby place a new and unprecedented strain on antitrust federalism. In a digital world where the effects of commercial conduct frequently are felt throughout the United States, the TCAA’s attack on efficient welfare-inducing business practices would have national (if not international) repercussions. The TCAA would alter business planning calculations for the worse and could interfere directly in the setting of national antitrust policy through congressional legislation and federal antitrust enforcement initiatives. It would also signal to foreign jurisdictions that the United States’ long-expressed staunch support for reliance on the Consumer Welfare Standard as the touchtone of sound antitrust enforcement is no longer fully operative.

#### It undermines health in 742 markets globally

Koski et al., 20 (Heli Koski, Otto Kässi, and Fabian Braesemann, Koski is a Research Director at Etla Economic Research and a Research Director at Aalto University, Kässi is a Researcher at Etla EconomicResearch., Braesemann is a Research fellow andData Scientist at Oxford University’s Saïd Business School., 1-7-2020, accessed on 8-20-2021, Etla , "Killers on the Road of Emerging Start-ups – Implications for Market Entry and Venture Capital Financing", https://www.etla.fi/en/publications/killers-on-the-road-of-emerging-start-ups-implications-for-market-entry-and-venture-capital-financing/)//Babcii

5. Conclusions We studied the effects of acquisitions made by the large US-based technology companies on the entry dynamics and venture capital financing in different product markets. We used **data from 742 product markets globally**, distinguishing the US and European markets for the years 2003-2018. Our estimation results suggest that the technology giants' buyouts subsequently reduced market entry rates and decreased available venture capital funding in the target product markets of tech giants' acquisitions. In other words, the acquisitions of data giants seem to generate the so-called kill zone effect. Our empirical analysis further suggests that the kill zone effect was strengthened during the 2010s when large technology companies gained increasing access to user data. Furthermore, we find that technology giants' acquisitions of platform companies have decreased market entry in non-platform markets.

#### 6. Business formation is useless for the general economy

Bagrie, 18 (Cameron Bagrie, Cameron Bagrie is the Managing Director of Bagrie Economics. Cameron has been an economist for 20 years. For over 11 years he was the Chief Economist at ANZ. He has also worked as an economist at the National Bank, Treasury and Statistics New Zealand., 8-9-2018, accessed on 8-21-2021, The Spinoff, "Business confidence is a hopeless indicator. But that doesn’t mean the economy isn’t in trouble", <https://thespinoff.co.nz/business/09-08-2018/business-confidence-is-bullshit-but-that-doesnt-mean-the-economy-isnt-in-trouble/)//Babcii>

The economy is headed for recession if you believe the readings from business confidence. Thankfully we can largely ignore business confidence readings. We can’t ignore other survey measures though that are saying growth has slowed and the official statistics are showing the same. The last three quarterly GDP prints have been 0.6, 0.6 and 0.5% and we only have data up to March 2018. That’s annualised growth in the low 2’s and a dip below 2% now looks likely. We have the potential for a growth pothole. That is becoming a concern as the wheels of the economy need to be turning and tax revenue coming in the door for social agenda demands to be met. A whopping net 45% of firms are pessimistic about the general economy according to the ANZ Business Outlook survey. That’s a level last seen around the global financial crisis. Of course, no one really believes things are that bad. We can’t blame the global scene as other countries would be seeing massive falls in confidence too if that was a key factor. Other countries are not. The New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) is showing weak readings for business confidence within their Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion (QSBO) too. The good news is that business confidence is hopeless as an economic indicator. The correlation with economic growth is poor and I largely ignore business confidence readings. Changes in direction can provide some insightful information – whether things are picking up or slowing down, but not the levels. Businesses tend to be more upbeat regarding general confidence about the economy under a blue flag as opposed to a red one. Business confidence averaged minus 18 between 2000 and 2007. The economy (measured by real gross domestic product) grew on average by more than 3.5% per year. Yep, confidence was negative, but growth was positive. So, we ignore business confidence as an economic indicator. This is nothing new. It’s surprising headline business confidence figures receive so much attention.

#### 7. Decline doesn’t cause war

Dr. Stephen M. Walt 20, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University, PhD in International Relations (with Distinction) from Stanford University, MA in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, Foreign Policy, 5/13/2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

# 1AR

## Cyber

### AT: AI DA

#### They won’t deploy new technology

Lemley and McCreary, 19 (Mark Lemley and Andrew McCreary, Lemley: Stanford Law School, McCreary: Stanford University, Graduate School of Business; Stanford Law School, 12-19-2019, accessed on 8-20-2021, Papers.ssrn, "Exit Strategy", <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3506919>)//Babcii

While these may be valid points in particular cases, they do not disprove nor help solve the problems of concentration caused by the norm of selling startups to incumbents. First, market structure matters. Markets that are not competitive not only distort prices but reduce innovation. 235 Further, incumbent **acquisitions prevent** potential **competitors from** combining to form a company that can credibly threaten **entry at scale**. 236 So reducing the possibility of Schumpeterian competition is likely to discourage innovation in the long run. And precisely because incumbency does bring some real advantages, we may need to create incentives to support Schumpeterian competition and avoid perpetual incumbency. In any event, the incumbent will put the innovation in the hands of more consumers **only if it actually deploys that product**. As we have seen, **incumbents often buy startups and then kill them**, either deliberately or by dissipating the team and not focusing on the acquired product.237 Incumbents have **less incentive to deploy** new technologies than startups do. That’s because incumbents who replace their existing product with a new one are mostly stealing customers from themselves.238 And **incumbents don’t need to innovate** to stay alive if they can buy any entrant that looks like a threat.239

#### Investors won’t even touch Tech

**Kennedy, 20** (Joe Kennedy, Joe Kennedy is a senior fellow at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. He focuses on economic policy. Dr. Kennedy has a law degree and a master’s degree in agricultural and applied economics from the University of Minnesota and a Ph.D. in economics from George Washington University., 11-9-2020, accessed on 8-20-2021, Itif, "Monopoly Myths: Is Big Tech Creating “Kill Zones”?", https://itif.org/publications/2020/11/09/monopoly-myths-big-tech-creating-kill-zones)//Babcii

Others worry that large technology companies deter investment because no one wants to challenge their market. At a recent antitrust workshop organized by the Department of Justice, investor Paul Arnold said: Everybody’s dissatisfied with LinkedIn. Every founder thinks there’s a better thing to be done. And they’re probably right. It’s not that good. But they have a very powerful network effect. It’ s just incredibly hard to overcome that network. And I’ve never seen something compelling. And so, my choice is investing in a company that’s going to try to do that, or has a very clear path for selling something in insurance, easy choice.4 In 2018, The Economist wrote, “Anything having to do with the consumer internet is perceived as dangerous, because of the dominance of Amazon, Facebook and Google…. Venture capitalists are wary of backing startups in online search, social media, mobile and e-commerce. It has become harder for startups to secure a first financing round.”5 The article predicts kill zones are likely to stay, partly because “the giants have tons of data to identify emerging rivals faster than ever before.”6 The House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law report states: Some venture capitalists, for example, report that there is an innovation “kill zone” that insulates dominant platforms from competitive pressure simply because investors do not view new entrants as worthwhile investments. Other investors have said that they avoid funding entrepreneurs and other companies that compete directly or indirectly with dominant firms in the digital economy.7

#### Zero correlation between hegemony and war – retrenchment’s stabilizing and avoids their offense – prefer empirics

Fettweis 17 (Christopher J, \*Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, College Park, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies 26:3, 423-451)//cmr

Overall, if either version is correct and global stability is provided by US hegemony, then maintaining that stability through a grand strategy based on either primacy (to neoconservatives) or “deep engagement” (to liberals) is clearly a wise choice.75 If, however, US actions are only tangentially related to the outbreak of the New Peace, or if any of the other proposed explanations are decisive, then the United States can retrench without fear of negative consequences. The grand strategy of the United States is therefore crucial to beliefs in hegemonic stability. Although few observers would agree on the details, most would probably acknowledge that post-Cold War grand strategies of American presidents have differed in some important ways. The four administrations are reasonable representations of the four ideal types outlined by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross in 1996.76 Under George H. W. Bush, the United States followed the path of “selective engagement,” which is sometimes referred to as “balance-of-power realism”; Bill Clinton’s grand strategy looks a great deal like what Posen and Ross call “cooperative security,” and others call “liberal internationalism”; George W. Bush, especially in his first term, forged a strategy that was as close to “primacy” as any president is likely to get; and Barack Obama, despite some early flirtation with liberalism, has followed a restrained realist path, which Posen and Ross label “neo-isolationism” but its proponents refer to as “strategic restraint.”77 In no case did the various anticipated disorders materialize. As Table 2 demonstrates, armed conflict levels fell steadily, irrespective of the grand strategic path Washington chose

. [graph omitted] Neither the primacy of George W. Bush nor the restraint of Barack Obama had much effect on the level of global violence. Despite continued warnings (and the high-profile mess in Syria), the world has not experienced an increase in violence while the United States chose uninvolvement. If the grand strategy of the United States is responsible for the New Peace, it is leaving no trace in the evidence. Perhaps we should not expect a correlation to show up in this kind of analysis. While US behavior might have varied in the margins during this period, nether its relative advantage over its nearest rivals nor its commitments waivered in any important way. However, it is surely worth noting that if trends opposite to those discussed in the previous two sections had unfolded, if other states had reacted differently to fluctuations in either US military spending or grand strategy, then surely hegemonic stability theorists would argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. Many liberals were on the lookout for chaos while George W. Bush was in the White House, just as neoconservatives have been quick to identify apparent worldwide catastrophe under President Obama.78 If increases in violence would have been evidence for the wisdom of hegemonic strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between US power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. The rest of the world appears quite capable and willing to operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise have precious little empirical support upon which to build their case. Hegemonic stability is a belief, in other words, rather than an established fact, and as such deserves a different kind of examination.

## Econ

### 1AR --- Econ

#### They are Apathetic

**Loo, 20** (Rory Loo, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale LawSchool Information Society Project., 11-10-2020, accessed on 8-13-2021, Live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite, "IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS: ADMINISTERINGA “RADICAL” REMEDY ", https://live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Van-Loo-final.pdf#page=36&zoom=100,0,0)//Babcii

Executives pursue such strategic breakups despite awareness of the expenses and complexity.194 Again, Hewlett-Packard executives predicted that the divestiture would take several years to complete, cost $1.8 billion, require extensive administrative management, and cause great internal upheaval.195 They proceeded despite that awareness and produced two highly profitable companies.196 What about in the context of technology-heavy deals? Antitrust scholars have urged particular caution in pursuing postmerger breakups in that space.197 The private sector has no such reservations, pursuing a number of divestitures years after consummation. Examples include PayPal and eBay, which had technologically integrated their platforms by the time the combined company decided to split, and AOL-Time Warner.198 Shareholders provide another perspective because they also demonstrate relative comfort with divestitures. Following unprofitable mergers and acquisitions, shareholders regularly pressure their managers to undo those consummated mergers even years later.199 In contrast, as described above, antitrust authorities have consistently declined to undo an anticompetitive merger mistakenly approved, even though they acknowledge—as have many scholars—that such mistakes have occurred.200 In other words, antitrust enforcers almost never fix their prior mistakes by breaking up a company, but shareholders regularly fix their managers’ mistakes by forcing a breakup.

#### a. Diversification

**Loo, 20** (Rory Loo, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale LawSchool Information Society Project., 11-10-2020, accessed on 8-13-2021, Live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite, "IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS: ADMINISTERINGA “RADICAL” REMEDY ", https://live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Van-Loo-final.pdf#page=36&zoom=100,0,0)//Babcii

If the concern about shareholders comes from fear of harm to people’s retirement and savings, the evolving structure of equity ownership is relevant. Most publicly traded shares of large companies now are owned by mutual funds and other institutional owners holding diverse stocks. As a result, the impact of any given breakup would be diluted for most shareholders. Additionally, if a breakup improved long-term market health—or immediately helped the monopoly’s competitors— most of a given monopoly’s shareholders could benefit from a breakup even if the broken-up company’s stock was hurt. Indeed, one of the leading studies found that although the prosecuted company’s stock went down, its rivals’ stock went up.220

#### b. Payoffs

**Loo, 20** (Rory Loo, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale LawSchool Information Society Project., 11-10-2020, accessed on 8-13-2021, Live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite, "IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS: ADMINISTERINGA “RADICAL” REMEDY ", https://live-cornell-law-review.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Van-Loo-final.pdf#page=36&zoom=100,0,0)//Babcii

Even if the concern is solely about an individual company’s shareholders, a breakup does not mean that a portion of the company is eliminated. If Google is forced to sell YouTube or Facebook is required to divest Instagram, shareholders would receive a massive payment for that sale.221 Overall, the literature consistently shows that private divestitures “have a positive impact on the divesting parent’s share price.”222

#### 6. Companies routinely break themselves up, the market will correct, and stock rebound outweighs

Loo, 20 (Rory Van Loo, a professor at Boston University and the author, most recently, of “In Defense of Breakups: Administering a ‘Radical’ Remedy.” He previously advised multinational corporate executives on mergers and acquisitions, 7-29-2020, accessed on 8-5-2021, The Hill, "Stop with the egg metaphor in discussing Big Tech break-ups", https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/509511-stop-with-the-egg-metaphor-in-discussing-big-tech-break-ups)//Babcii

The metaphor is misguided. Businesses routinely break themselves up. More than [3,000 voluntary divestitures occur each year](https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/27/when-a-piece-of-your-company-no-longer-fits-what-boards-need-to-know-about-divestitures/), amounting to about [a third of all mergers and acquisitions](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23414264). Many are enormous. Not that long ago, Hewlett-Packard [split itself](https://www.wsj.com/articles/hewlett-packard-to-split-into-two-companies-1412592132) down the middle to create [two independent Fortune 100 companies](https://fortune.com/fortune500/2017/search/). Last year Fox sold its movie business to Disney for [$71 billion](https://www.foxbusiness.com/media/fox-disney-prepare-to-close-transformative-71-3-billion-deal). In other words, while most in the government and academia see breakups as [“radical” and “extreme,”](https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1951&context=faculty_scholarship) leading business executives see them as a standard part of corporate governance. I know because I have advised executives at several of the nation’s largest companies on massive reorganizations. If we must analogize monopolies to eggs, at the very least we should recognize that while nobody unscrambles eggs, we regularly carve up omelets after they’re prepared. This seemingly harmless metaphor expresses a potentially devastating worldview that helps explain why the government has not broken up any of the largest U.S. companies since 1984. That’s when the Department of Justice [split the AT&T monopoly into seven pieces](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/552/131/1525975/), a move widely celebrated — especially by [consumers who were paying over eight dollars for a five-minute call from Washington, D.C. to New York](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19840810_IP0257A_38f13e13d3220c8f7c56fd39ad97d87f5fe325ed.pdf). Today, however, even many leading [left-leaning intellectuals](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/16/break-up-facebook-there-are-smarter-ways-rein-big-tech/) calling for more aggressive antitrust enforcement oppose splitting up Big Tech due to breakups’ perceived messiness. They prefer other remedies, like mandating “access.” Access mandates leave the monopoly in place but require it to help competitors. For instance, rather than forcing Facebook to divest its previous acquisition, Instagram, the social network could be required to allow users to transfer their accounts or post simultaneously to other social networks. One clear problem with this and other alternative remedies is that they are unlikely to deter anticompetitive behavior. At trial, [companies almost always fight for something other than breakups](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/97/59/2339529/). Weaker remedies give CEOs incentives to build monopolies. Equally problematic is that these other remedies are extremely difficult and expensive. For example, requiring Amazon to share its platform fairly with competitors would require ongoing monitoring by the government over decades to ensure compliance. In contrast, breakups are cleaner and cheaper because they provide a one-off event after which the government can move on. By instead pushing antitrust toward government-heavy remedies, the resistance to breakups leaves antitrust with only unattractive options. Unattractive remedies mean enforcers are less likely to take any action. In other words, the animosity toward breakups has enfeebled the very institution of antitrust in America. Of course, while breakups of Facebook and Instagram or Google and Waze may make sense, there are limits to how much some of these tech companies can be carved up without harming consumers. And antitrust breakups involve considerable costs in executing the reorganization. As a result, some caution is appropriate in choosing them as the remedy, and access mandates have a place in the antitrust arsenal. It would be a mistake to launch into an indiscriminate breakup rampage of all concentrated industries. In weighing those costs, however, authorities should recognize that even private divestitures require tremendous organizational expenses. The key in both public and private breakups is not to let the inevitable reorganization costs prevent economic progress. In 1911, John D. Rockefeller’s lawyers argued that breaking up his oil monopoly would not only be dangerous to the industry, but [calamitous to shareholders](https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/conlr31&div=44&id=&page=). Similar arguments were made before the [AT&T breakup](https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/01/us/bell-system-breakup-opens-era-of-great-expectations-and-great-concern.html). But [Rockefeller’s wealth skyrocketed after the Standard Oil breakup](https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1016/S0193-5895(04)21002-8/full/html), and AT&T shareholders who held onto their stock earned [high returns](https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/conlr31&div=44&id=&page=). That’s because buyers of broken up monopolies pay for the carved-up pieces. And smaller, [nimbler companies can better adapt to changing markets](https://oxfordre.com/business/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190224851.001.0001/acrefore-9780190224851-e-17?rskey=3EpcPb&result=86). More importantly, nobody can deny that [those U.S. industries subsequently flourished and led the world](https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/conlr31&div=44&id=&page=). A better antitrust analogy would be to firefighting. [The Forest Service](https://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/dbnf/home/?cid=stelprdb5281464#:~:text=Controlled%20burning%20allows%20the%20Forest,the%20accumulation%20of%20flammable%20fuels.) regularly manages controlled burns, which prevent catastrophic wildfires and enable ecosystems to thrive. Occasional breakups that have costs in the short-term can help make markets healthier in the long run. The harms to our economy from large monopolies are far more certain than the speculative fears of messy breakups.